Federal Greenhouse Gas Control Options from an Enforcement Perspective by Schang, Scott & Chan, Teresa
SCHANG-CHA N VISUAL (DO NOT DELETE)  3/11/2016 1:31 PM 
 
Federal Greenhouse Gas Control Options 
from an Enforcement Perspective 
SCOTT SCHANG*                                                                               
TERESA CHAN** 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  OVERVIEW OF GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL OPTIONS............................................ 89 
A. Cap-and-Trade Programs ........................................................................... 89 
1. The Waxman-Markey Bill..................................................................... 94 
2. The Kerry-Lieberman Bill .................................................................... 96 
3. The Cantwell-Collins Bill ..................................................................... 98 
B. Regulating Greenhouse Gases Using a Carbon Tax................................. 100 
C. Regulating Greenhouse Gases Under the Clean Air Act .......................... 102 
1. Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Permits..................... 103 
2. New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) ..................................... 104 
3. National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) ........................... 106 
4. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air  
 Pollutants (NESHAP)  ......................................................................... 108 
II.  COMPARING ENFORCEMENT ASPECTS OF CONTROL OPTIONS .............................. 109 
A. Regulatory Complexity .............................................................................. 109 
1. Agency Expertise and Coordination ................................................... 110 
2. Amount of Time and Resources to Implement .................................... 114 
B.  Number and Variety of Sources................................................................. 117 
C. Monitoring, Reporting and Verification .................................................... 120 
D. Transparency............................................................................................. 126 
 *  Vice President, Climate & Sustainability, Environmental Law Institute.  The authors 
thank Catherine McLinn, Paulo Lopes and Michael Liu for their assistance in preparing this 
paper. Leslie Carothers, President of the Environmental Law Institute, assisted in framing the 
issues and commenting on drafts of the paper. We also thank Professors John Dernbach and 
Lee Paddock for their thoughtful comments. The views expressed are those of the authors, 
and not necessarily those of Environmental Law Institute. 
 **  Staff Attorney, Environmental Law Institute. 
 87 
 
SCHANG-CHA N VISUAL (DO NOT DELETE)  3/11/2016  1:31 PM 
 
E. Role of Citizens .......................................................................................... 132 
F. Role of the States  ....................................................................................... 135 
G. Penalties  .................................................................................................... 138 
III.  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 142 
 
Although numerous articles have been written about the various 
legislative and regulatory options available to control greenhouse gases, 
only a handful of these articles have focused on implementation and 
enforcement. Enforcement plays an essential role in the success of any 
environmental program. While many countries have well-written 
environmental laws that contain laudatory goals, only a few of these 
countries have the enforcement resources and expertise necessary to 
achieve the kind of results that the United States has been able to achieve.  
As the United States considers how best to address climate change, it is 
important to consider how the various legislative and regulatory options 
will be enforced so as to ensure that the ultimate objectives of the programs 
will be achieved.1 
As part of the University of San Diego Law School’s Second Annual 
Climate and Energy Law Symposium, we decided to review the 
enforcement provisions of the main federal greenhouse gas control 
options, with a view to drawing lessons from that review that could 
inform policy choices and program design. Our review suggests that 
there are relative strengths and weaknesses, as well important tradeoffs 
to be made, in the enforcement provisions of each of the leading 
candidate programs.  Our review further suggests that some revisions 
should be made to these provisions to help ensure that the greenhouse 
gas control programs meet their environmental goals. 
This paper is divided into three sections. Section I provides an 
overview of the main legislative and regulatory options being considered 
at the federal level to control greenhouse gases.  These include cap-and-
trade programs, carbon tax proposals, as well as existing authority under 
the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).2 In Section II, we compare these options 
from an enforcement perspective, considering regulatory complexity, 
monitoring, reporting and verification, the roles of states and of citizens, 
transparency in government, and penalties, in order to tease out the 
 1. Enforcement also provides secondary benefits that should not be underestimated. A 
strong, transparent, and fair enforcement system contributes to the development and 
respect of t he rule of law. It also provides citizens an opportunit y  t o be involved 
in environmental improvement through citizen suits and complaints. Strong monitoring 
and reporting provisions can also help to inform the public about the extent and sources 
of greenhouse gases, which—beyond providing a basis for citizen suits and complaints— 
can exert its own pressure on sources to reduce emissions. 
 2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q. 
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important differences among the options and draw lessons for program 
design and implementation.3 Section III summarizes our conclusions. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL OPTIONS 
Identifying viable federal greenhouse gas control options in 2010 is 
like playing whack-a-mole: the options seem to change daily because of 
shifting political winds blown by unpredictable factors like the economy 
and disasters such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. What has not 
changed, however, are the basic tools at the disposal of Congress and the 
Obama Administration to tackle greenhouse gas emissions: cap-and-
trade systems, carbon taxes, and the provisions of the CAA. Accordingly, 
although the precise details of any eventual law or program may differ, 
we focus on these tools and outline their relevant provisions in this section. 
A.  Cap-and-Trade Programs 
Several proposals for a cap-and-trade program have already been 
introduced in both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives with  
varying degrees of success. Given their importance, below we provide 
an overview of how cap-and-trade programs are generally structured. 
We then explain the importance of enforcement in these programs, using 
the Acid Rain Program as an example. After this, we examine three cap-
and-trade proposals that have received the most attention to date. 
In a cap-and-trade program, a cap is set on the total amount of 
pollutants that can be emitted by regulated entities during a fixed 
compliance period. The cap is then divided into emission allowances and 
distributed, either through direct allocations or through an auction.4 
Allowances are tradable, although there may be restrictions on who may 
buy or sell them. At the end of each compliance period, regulated 
entities must submit a sufficient number of allowances to cover their 
 3. We focus on civil penalties. The criminal provisions of the various options are 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
 4. See Lesley K. McAllister, Putting Persuasion Back in the Equation: Compliance in 
Cap and Trade Programs, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 299, 315 (2007) [hereinafter Persuasion]. 
For a more detailed description of cap and trade, see Pew Center on Global Climate 
Change & t he Pew Center on t he St ates , Climate Change 101: Cap and Trade (Jan. 
2009), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Cap-Trade-101-02-2008.pdf. 
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emissions during that period.5 Regulated entities that have insufficient 
allowances are assessed penalties. 
Because regulated entities have the option of trading allowances in 
order to meet their compliance obligations, a market for emission 
allowances is created. This market is particularly active where entities 
face varying costs to abate their emissions. Indeed, “[w]here costs are 
different, there is ‘room for a deal,’ as high-cost sources have the incentive 
to buy allowances from low-cost sources.”6 Costs can be further reduced 
by allowing the use of offset credits, which are emissions reductions 
from non-regulated sources that would not otherwise have occurred and 
that can be used by regulated sources to demonstrate compliance. A cap-
and-trade program therefore provides regulated entities flexibility in 
achieving compliance obligations while reducing the overall costs of 
abating emissions.7 
Although cap-and-trade programs use a market mechanism, they are 
in fact regulatory programs that need a rigorous enforcement system in 
place in order to properly develop.8 In the absence of such a system, 
regulated entities would be able to underreport their emissions, allowing 
them to submit fewer allowances than necessary to cover their emissions 
during the compliance period.9 This would lead to environmental 
objectives not being met: if emissions are underreported, “the cap may 
be reported as being met, but not be met in fact.”10 In addition, the 
market would not function properly. This is because regulated entities 
that underreport their emissions would be able to sell their excess 
allowances on the market, not only providing them with an unfair 
advantage, but also increasing the supply of allowances in the market. 
This, in turn, would inappropriately decrease the value of the allowances, 
 5. See Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving 
Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 398 (2009). 
 6. Stephanie Benkovic & Joseph Kruger, To Trade or Not to Trade? Criteria for 
Applying Cap and Trade, Optimizing Nitrogen Management in Food and Energy Production 
and Environmental Protection:  Proceedings of the 2nd International Nitrogen Conference on 
Science and Policy, THE SCIENTIFIC WORLD 1, 3 (2001) [hereinafter To Trade or Not to 
Trade]. 
 7. A. Denny Ellermanet al., Emissions Trading in the U.S.: Experience, Lessons, 
and Considerations for Greenhouse Gases, Pew Center on Global Climate Change i, iii 
(May 2003), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-in-depth/all_reports/ 
emissions_trading [hereinafter Emissions Trading in the U.S.]. 
 8. See John Schakenbach et al., Fundamentals of Successful Monitoring, Reporting, 
and Verification Under a Cap-and-Trade Program, 56 J. AIR & WASTE M GMT. ASS’N 1576, 
1578 (Nov. 2006) [hereinafter Fundamentals]. 
 9. Persuasion, supra note 4, at 318. 
 10. Id.; see also To Trade or Not to Trade, supra note 6, at 3. 
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depriving other legitimate allowance holders some of the value of their 
emissions reductions.11 
At the same time, markets are built on the confidence that market 
participants have in the market itself. As the financial meltdown of 2008 
showed, when any key element of a market loses participant confidence, 
the entire market can freeze or cease to function.12 In order to instill 
confidence in the integrity of the market, a rigorous enforcement system, 
including appropriate monitoring, reporting and verification, is needed.13 
A rigorous enforcement system instills confidence in the market “by 
verifying the existence and value of the traded allowance,”14 thereby 
allowing market participants to “manage the risks inherent in 
environmental projects and market-based programs.”15 
Experience with the Acid Rain Program has shown that enforcement 
is essential to the success of a cap-and-trade program. The Acid Rain 
Program, which was established under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air 
Act Amendments, requires the progressive reduction of SO2 emissions 
from certain electric power utilities.16 Under the program, emissions of 
SO2 are to be reduced to a level of 8.95 million tons annually, or 
approximately half of their 1980 levels, by 2010.17 The “centerpiece” of 
the Acid Rain Program is its cap-and-trade system.18 Similar to the basic 
 11. See Persuasion, supra note 4, at 318. 
 12. See generally Supplemental Notice for the Proposed National Emissions Standards 
for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 69 Fed. Reg. 12,398, 12,412–13 (Mar. 16, 2004) (codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 13. See, e.g., id. (consistent and efficient enforcement of rules is important for success 
of mercury trading market). 
 14. Lesley K. McAllister, Beyond Playing “Banker”: The Role of the Regulatory 
Agency in Emissions Trading, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 282 (2007) [hereinafter Beyond 
Playing Banker]. 
 15. Kenneth J. Markowitz & Meredith R. Koparova, Compliance Is Essential to the 
Environmental and Financial Integrity of Carbon Markets in INECE Special Report on 
Climate Compliance 7 (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.inece.org/climate/Special Report 
ClimateCompliance.pdf [hereinafter Compliance]. 
 16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o (1990). See EPA, Clean Air Markets: Emission, 
Compliance, and Market Data, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/ARP_1.html (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Emission, Compliance, and Market Data]. 
 17. See EPA, Clean Air Markets: SO2 Reductions and Allowance Trading Under 
the Acid Rain Program, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/s02.html (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2010) [hereinafter SO2 Reductions and Allowance Trading]; see also Dallas Burtraw 
& Byron Swift, A New Standard of Performance: An Analysis of the Clean Air Act’s 
Acid Rain Program, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,411, 10,413 (1996) [hereinafter New Standard 
of Performance]. 
 18. See SO2 Reductions and Allowance Trading, supra note 17. 
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structure of any cap-and-trade program, allowances are distributed to 
regulated entities, which are entitled to emit one ton of SO2 for each 
allowance held. Allowances are freely tradable. At the end of each 
compliance period, regulated entities must submit a sufficient number of 
allowances to cover their emissions during that period or be assessed a 
penalty. 
This SO2 cap-and-trade program has been credited with achieving an 
“unprecedented level of environmental protection in a cost-effective 
manner.”19  In fact, a 2003 U.S. Office of Management and Budget study 
found that the “Acid Rain Program has accounted for the largest 
quantified human health benefits of any federal regulatory program 
implemented in the last 10 [years], with annual benefits exceeding costs 
by [greater than] 40 to 1.”20 This program has been “widely recognized 
as a resounding success.”21 
Several commentators have attributed the success of the Acid Rain 
Program to its rigorous enforcement system.22 Under the program, 
regulated entities are required to continuously monitor their SO2 emissions, 
with most entities using continuous emissions monitoring systems 
(“CEMS”).23 CEMS are required to record emissions data every 15 
minutes.24 These data, which must be consolidated and reported to the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) on a quarterly basis, are 
considered to be “the ‘gold standard’ that backs up the currency of 
emission allowances.”25 Indeed, CEMS have been “essential for accurately 
 19. To Trade or Not to Trade, supra note 6, at 1. 
 20. Fundamentals, supra note 8, at 1576; see also EPA, Cap and Trade: Acid Rain 
Program Results, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/cap-trade/docs/ctresults.pdf (last visited Jan. 
20, 2010). 
 21. Jonas Monast, Climate Change and Financial Markets: Regulating the Trade 
Side of Cap and Trade, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,051, 10,052 (Jan. 2010) 
[hereinafter Financial Markets]. 
 22. Compliance, supra note 15, at 5 (stating that the success of the Acid Rain Program 
was a “direct result of the strong monitoring, reporting, and verification requirements”); 
see also Emission Trading in the U.S., supra note 7, at 16. 
 23. See EPA, Clean Air Markets: Acid Rain Program, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/ 
progsregs/arp/basic.html#cem (last visited Jan. 20, 2010). Thirty-six percent (36%) of 
these entities, which account for 96% of SO2 emissions under the program, use CEMS. See 
Persuasion, supra note 4, at 319. The other entities determine their emissions through certain 
proxies. For example, units burning natural gas may determine emissions by multiplying 
the sulfur content of gas (measured by daily sampling and analysis) by the volume of gas 
combusted. See U.S. EPA, Clean Air Markets: Continuous Emissions Monitoring Fact Sheet, 
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/emissions/continuous-factsheet.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2010). 
 24. Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: An Analysis of the Utility 
Sector’s Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide Under the Clean 
Air Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 321 (2001) [hereinafter Environmental Laws]. 
 25. Blas Perez Henriquez, Information Technology: The Unsung Hero of Market 
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quantifying [SO2 emissions] and that accuracy in turn promotes smoothly 
operating markets and environmental integrity.”26 At the same time, the 
program imposes severe penalties on entities that fail to comply with 
emission caps: for each ton of SO2 emitted in excess of the cap, a 
regulated entity must pay a fine of $2,000, well above the less-than-$300 
market value for a ton of SO2.27 In addition to paying a fine, entities must 
forfeit allowances from future years to cover their excess emissions, and 
may be subject to criminal and civil penalties. Penalties are assessed 
immediately and automatically.28 As a result of these high penalties and 
strict monitoring, “there has been virtually 100 percent compliance with 
[the Acid Rain Program’s] emission [caps] with little need for enforcement 
action.”29 This program therefore “shows that cap-and-trade schemes—
with sufficient compliance and enforcement regimes—can deliver 
substantial environmental benefits at low costs.”30 
Recognizing the success of the Acid Rain Program, enforcement of a 
greenhouse gas program will likely pose unique challenges. In fact, there 
are likely to be several important differences between the Acid Rain 
Program and any greenhouse gas program that will likely make enforcement 
of greenhouse gas caps more challenging than enforcement of SO2 caps. 
These include: 
• The number of greenhouse gas pollutants being regulated; 
• The number and variety of sources of these pollutants; 
• The sophistication of the regulated sources with air pollution 
controls and markets; and 
• The role of offsets. 
In light of these differences, the manner in which the various greenhouse 
gas programs approach enforcement will likely have a significant effect 
on their success. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Clearing prices for SO2 allowances have ranged widely, peaking at $860 per 
ton and going as low as $36 per ton. Clearing prices have averaged roughly $300 per ton 
over the life of the Acid Rain Program. See generally http://www.epa.gov/airmarket/trading/ 
auction.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2010). 
 28. Environmental Laws, supra note 24, at 403–04. From 1995 until 2004, only 23 units 
were found to be out of compliance, emitting 1,195 tons of excess emissions. The EPA 
assessed fines totaling $3,856,513 for these violations. In addition, EPA has assessed fines 
totaling $589,805 for nine monitoring violations. See Persuasion, supra note 4, at 321–22. 
 29. New Standard of Performance, supra note 17, at 10,422. 
 30. Compliance, supra note 15, at 5. 
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To review potential federal greenhouse gas cap-and-trade programs, 
we will focus on three cap-and-trade bills that have garnered the most 
attention to date: the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 
(“Waxman-Markey”),31 the discussion draft of the American Power Act 
(“Kerry-Lieberman”)32 and the Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s 
Renewal Act (“Cantwell-Collins”).33 These bills have important differences 
that highlight how upfront program design may result in enforcement 
deficiencies that threaten a program’s environmental integrity. 
1.  The Waxman-Markey Bill 
On June 26, 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed 
Waxman-Markey, which, among other things, establishes a cap-and-
trade system to facilitate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions across 
most of the U.S. economy. Specifically, the bill requires the progressive 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from the entire economy so that: 
• By 2012, emissions are reduced to 97% of 2005 levels; 
• By 2020, emissions are reduced to 80% of 2005 levels; 
• By 2030, emissions are reduced to 58% of 2005 levels; and 
• By 2050, emissions are reduced to 17% of 2005 levels.34 
The bill sets forth similar emission reduction goals for regulated 
entities.35 Under the bill, seven gases are designated as greenhouse 
gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), sulfur 
hexafluoride (SF6), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) 
and nitrogen trifluoride (NF3).36 All greenhouse gases are measured in 
terms of their CO2 equivalence value.37  Entities regulated under the bill 
include, among others, electricity producers, greenhouse gas importers 
and stationary sources that emit 25,000 or more tons of CO2 equivalence 
(“major GHG source”).38 
In order to achieve its emission reduction goals, Waxman-Markey 
establishes an emission allowance system, whereby a fixed number of 
 31. American Clean Energy  and Security Act , H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) 
[hereinafter Waxman-Markey]. 
 32. American Power Act , S. Discussion Draft, 111t h Cong. (2010) [hereinafter 
Kerry-Lieberman]. 
 33. Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s Renewal, S. 2877, 111th Cong. (2009) 
[hereinafter Cantwell-Collins]. 
 34. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 702. 
 35. Id. § 703. 
 36. In addition to these gases, EPA has the authority to designate any other 
anthropogenic gas as a greenhouse gas for purposes of the bill.  Id. § 711(a). 
 37. Id. § 712. 
 38. Id. § 700(13). 
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allowances are distributed annually. Each allowance represents one ton 
of CO2 equivalence value.39 Regulated entities are required to hold a 
sufficient number of allowances at the end of each compliance period in 
order to cover their greenhouse gas emissions during that period. 
In addition to holding emission allowances, regulated entities may 
also satisfy a part of their compliance obligations through the use of 
offset credits. Offset credits may be issued for projects or activities that 
would not otherwise have occurred and which avoid, reduce or sequester 
greenhouse gas emissions. Waxman-Markey limits the number of offset 
credits that may be used each year in lieu of emission allowances to two 
billion, with one offset credit equal to one emission allowance.40  
Under the bill, EPA is responsible for establishing an offsets program 
and must, among other things, promulgate regulations to ensure that 
offset credits represent verifiable, additional and permanent greenhouse gas 
reductions.41  EPA is also responsible for establishing a list of projects 
that will be eligible to generate domestic and international offsets.42 In 
order to protect the integrity of the offsets program, the bill creates an 
independent Offsets Integrity Advisory Board. The board is required to 
make recommendations to EPA for its use in promulgating regulations, 
as well as in other aspects of the program.43 
For offsets related to domestic agricultural and forestry sources, the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), and not EPA, is given 
authority to establish an offsets program. Similar to EPA’s offsets 
program, Waxman-Markey requires USDA to ensure that credits generated 
under its offsets program represent verifiable, additional and permanent 
greenhouse gas reductions.44 To this end, USDA is required to prepare a 
list of domestic agricultural and forestry practice types that are eligible 
 39. Initially, the majority of allowances will be distributed for free to entities identified 
under the bill. The remaining allowances will be auctioned in accordance with the guidelines 
set forth in the bill. Over time, the number of allowances that will be auctioned will begin to 
increase, with approximately 70% of allowances being auctioned by 2030. Pew Center 
on Global Climate Change, At a Glance: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, 
available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Waxman-Markey-short-summary-
revised-June26.pdf. 
 40. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 722(d)(1). This limit may be increased in 
certain circumstances. Id. Starting in 2018, entities will require 1.25 international offset 
credits for every emission allowance. Id. 
 41. Id. § 732(a), (b). 
 42. Id. § 733. 
 43. Id. § 731(a). 
 44. Id. § 502. 
 95 
 
SCHANG-CHA N VISUAL (DO NOT DELETE)  3/11/2016  1:31 PM 
 
to generate offset credits.45 The USDA is also required to establish its 
own advisory committee to provide scientific and technical advice on its 
offsets program, as well as to ensure the environmental integrity of the 
program.46 
Waxman-Markey allows emission allowances and offset credits to be 
freely traded.47 Oversight of the allowance and offset market is the 
responsibility of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), 
while oversight of the derivatives market is the responsibility of the 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”). In addition, the 
President is required to establish a working group, which is to include 
EPA and representatives of other “relevant” agencies, in order to make 
recommendations to CFTC regarding “proposed regulations for the 
establishment, operation, and oversight of markets for regulated allowance 
derivatives.”48 
The greenhouse gas provisions of Waxman-Markey are to be 
implemented and enforced through the existing system of CAA permits, 
specifically Title V operating permits.49 EPA implements these 
requirements through the states: states adopt programs that are at least as 
stringent as the federal requirements and EPA certifies that the programs 
adhere to federal standards, thus authorizing the states to implement the 
CAA. This means that most regulated entities will submit permit 
applications to their state air authorities, which will implement and 
enforce these requirements. The major exception is that EPA will retain 
oversight of the central emissions and offset trading market through 
recording and tracking credits.50 
2.  The Kerry-Lieberman Bill 
Although Waxman-Markey passed the House of Representatives in 
the 111th Congress, the future of greenhouse gas control options in the 
Senate is highly uncertain. No cap-and-trade approach appears to have 
reasonable prospects of passage in the 112th Congress given the 2010 
Congressional election results.  Until mid-2010, the leading option was 
Kerry-Lieberman, which was released in discussion draft form on May 
12, 2010. Kerry-Lieberman requires the progressive reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions in order to meet certain economy-wide targets, 
 45. Id. § 503. 
 46. Id. § 531. 
 47. Id. §§ 724(a), 742, 508(b). 
 48. Id. § 401(c)(1). 
 49. Id. §§ 727, 835. 
 50. See id. § 724(d). 
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which are similar to those set forth in Waxman-Markey.51 In addition, 
Kerry-Lieberman designates substantially the same gases as greenhouse 
gases, regulates substantially the same entities and uses substantially the 
same emission allowance system as Waxman-Markey.52 
One of the salient differences between Waxman-Markey and Kerry-
Lieberman relates to the offsets program. Like Waxman-Markey, 
Kerry-Lieberman allows regulated entities to satisfy part of their 
compliance obligations through the use of offset credits.53 USDA and 
EPA are to share responsibility over the offsets program: USDA is 
responsible for administering the domestic agriculture and forestry 
offsets program, while EPA is responsible for administering the rest of 
the program.54  Unlike Waxman-Markey, Kerry-Lieberman requires USDA 
and EPA to work together more closely in implementing their programs. 
For example, USDA and EPA are required to jointly:  (1) establish the 
domestic offsets program;55 (2) establish an advisory committee to 
provide scientific and technical advice regarding the domestic program;56 
and (3) promulgate regulations in order to implement the domestic 
program.57 
It is nonetheless important to note that, even though Kerry-Lieberman 
requires a joint effort between USDA and EPA in regards to domestic 
offsets, USDA still retains significant independent authority to implement 
the agricultural and forestry-related offsets program. Indeed, USDA is 
the “lead agency” for agricultural and forestry-related offset projects, 
and USDA alone establishes and maintains a list of projects eligible to 
generate offset credits,58 approves offset projects,59 and conducts random 
audits and reviews of those projects.60 
 51. Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, § 702. 
 52. Id. §§ 700(12), 722(a). Certain entities, including industrial sources, will not be 
regulated until 2016.  See id. § 722(c). 
 53. Id. § 722(d)(1)(A). 
 54. Id. § 733(c). 
 55. Id. § 733(a)(1)(A). 
 56. Id. § 732(a)(1). 
 57. Id. § 733(a)(1)(B). 
 58. Id. § 734(a)(1). USDA is required to provide an explanation if this list differs 
from the recommendations of the joint advisory committee. Id. § 734(a)(2). 
 59. Id. § 736(b). 
 60. Id. § 739. Kerry-Lieberman does, however, require audit protocols and guidelines 
to be jointly developed by EPA and USDA.  See id. § 739(a). 
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3.  The Cantwell-Collins Bill 
Another option pending in the U.S. Senate is Cantwell-Collins, which 
was introduced on December 11, 2009.61 Similar to Waxman-Markey 
and Kerry-Lieberman, Cantwell-Collins requires the progressive reduction 
of greenhouse gases in order to meet certain economy-wide targets.62 
These targets are the same as those set forth in Waxman-Markey and 
Kerry-Lieberman. In addition, under Cantwell-Collins, substantially the 
same gases are identified as greenhouse gases as under Waxman-Markey 
and Kerry-Lieberman.63 
In order to assist in meeting the economy-wide targets, Cantwell-
Collins requires the Secretary of the Treasury (the “Secretary”) to establish 
by regulation a program within the Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.64 This program is not explicitly tied 
to the economy-wide targets set forth in the bill. Indeed, under the 
program, the Secretary is only required to place a progressively declining 
limit on the amount of “fossil carbon” permitted to be sold into U.S. 
commerce.65 As a result, the program captures CO2 emissions and not 
any other greenhouse gas.66  In addition, the emission reduction goals 
for fossil carbon are not clearly defined. Rather, Cantwell-Collins 
requires the President, in consultation with the Secretary, EPA and the 
Secretary of Energy, to establish the maximum quantity of fossil carbon, 
and the corresponding number of emission allowances (called “carbon 
shares” in the Act), that are permitted to be introduced into U.S. 
commerce starting in calendar year 2012. This quantity must equal “the 
approximate level of fossil carbon likely to be required” by the U.S. 
economy in that year and will remain at the same level for calendar 
years 2013 and 2014.67 Then, starting in 2015, this quantity is to be 
 61. Cantwell-Collins, supra note 33. 
 62. Id. § 3. 
 63. Unlike Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman, Cantwell-Collins does not 
specifically designate NF3 as a greenhouse gas. Cantwell-Collins does, however, include a 
provision similar to Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman that allows EPA to include “any 
other anthropogenically emitted gas that [it], after notice and comment, determines to 
contribute to climate change.” Id. § 2(12)(G). 
 64. Id. § 4(a)(1). 
 65. The term “fossil carbon” is defined as “(A) carbon in the form of a fossil fuel 
(such as coal, natural gas, and crude oil) in the raw state in which the fossil fuel exists at 
the time the fossil fuel is removed from the Earth; and (B) the carbon content of imported 
refined fuel products (such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuels) derived from a fossil fuel.” 
Id. § 2(11). 
 66. The bill contains the “sense of the Senate” urging the federal government to 
take further actions to “decrease the risks associated with greenhouse gas emissions” from 
fossil carbon sources.  Id. § 7(2). 
 67. Id. §§ 4(a)(2)(A)(ii), 4(a)(2)(B)(i). 
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reduced by 0.25% each year from the previous calendar year.68 The 
President is entitled to modify this quantity in order to respond to certain 
factors set forth in the bill, but any such modification must be approved 
by Congress through a joint resolution.69 
Only “upstream” sources of fossil carbon are to be regulated under the 
program. Specifically, only “first sellers” are required to periodically 
surrender carbon shares to the Secretary.70 First sellers are defined as 
entities that are “in the business of producing or importing fossil carbon 
or production process carbon, as determined by the Secretary.”71 Although 
the Secretary has the discretion to determine which entities are first 
sellers for purposes of the bill, it has been estimated that 2,000 entities 
would be regulated under such a program.72 First sellers are required to 
surrender carbon shares within two years after the date on which fossil 
carbon is introduced into U.S. commerce, combusted or released by a 
first seller, or transferred as a royalty-in-kind.73 
Cantwell-Collins establishes a fairly limited market for carbon shares. 
Each carbon share represents one ton of fossil carbon.74 In order to 
obtain carbon shares, first sellers must purchase them from one of two 
sources: a monthly auction conducted by the Secretary, or a public 
carbon share exchange established and administered by the Secretary. 
The only entities eligible to participate in the auctions are first sellers.75 
Similarly, the only entities eligible to purchase carbon shares on the 
carbon share exchange are first sellers.76  First sellers are prohibited 
from either directly or indirectly creating, purchasing, selling, or trading 
carbon share derivatives.77  The Secretary, in consultation with CFTC, 
FERC, and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), is nonetheless 
required to promulgate regulations to establish markets for carbon share 
 68. Id. § 4(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
 69. Id. § 4(a)(3)(C). 
 70. Id. § 4(a)(1)(B). 
 71. Id. § 2(10). The term “production process carbon” is defined as “the quantity 
of fossil carbon used to manufacture an energy-intensive commodity.” Id. § 2(14). 
 72. See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address 
Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 313 (2008) [hereinafter Meaningful]. Stavins 
refers to upstream regulation as regulation “at the point of fossil fuel extraction, import, 
processing, or distribution.” Id. at 309. 
 73. Cantwell-Collins, supra note 33, § 4(a)(1)(B) (2009). 
 74. Id. § 2(4). 
 75. Id. § 4(b)(2). 
 76. Id. § 4(b)(7)(A). 
 77. Id. § 4(b)(8)(A). 
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derivatives within one year of the bill’s enactment. These regulations are 
to provide for effective and comprehensive market oversight; prohibit 
fraud, market manipulation and excessive speculation; and limit 
unreasonable or excessive fluctuations in the price of carbon shares and 
carbon share derivatives.78 
Cantwell-Collins further limits the market for carbon shares by largely 
eliminating offsets. Under the bill, only three types of offset activities are 
eligible to generate carbon shares: (1) carbon capture and storage 
facilities, (2) oil or gas re-injection projects, and (3) the manufacture of 
products with embedded fossil carbon.79  Entities that receive carbon 
shares from these activities will be granted limited access to the public 
carbon share exchange for the purpose of selling their shares to eligible 
first sellers.80  Information relevant to the transaction, including transaction 
dates, carbon share quantities, and prices, are to be made available to the 
public “on a real-time basis.”81 
B.  Regulating Greenhouse Gases Using a Carbon Tax 
Another market-based approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
is a carbon tax. Under a carbon tax, a fee is levied on each ton of CO2 
emitted or each ton of carbon contained in fossil fuels.82 The tax 
motivates regulated entities to reduce their emissions if the cost of doing 
so is less than the cost of paying the tax.83 As a result, a carbon tax 
differs from a cap-and-trade program in a fundamental respect: a tax sets 
an “upper limit” on the costs of reducing emissions.84 This creates 
certainty in regards to costs.85 At the same time, unlike a cap-and-trade 
program, a carbon tax does not set an upper limit on the amount of 
emissions in a given year. Any reduction in emissions would therefore 
be dependent on whether, in that year, the costs of emission reductions 
were less than the carbon tax, leaving reductions subject to such 
variables as weather, availability of new carbon reduction technologies 
 78. Id. § 4(b)(8)(B). 
 79. Id. § 4(c). 
 80. Id. § 4(b)(7)(B). 
 81. Id. § 4(b)(7)(A). 
 82. U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, POLICY OPTIONS FOR REDUCING CO2 EMISSIONS 
vii (2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ft p docs /89xx/doc8934/02-12-Carbon.pdf 
[hereinafter Policy Options]. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.; see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global 
Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming Than Cap 
and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 36 (2009) [hereinafter Better Response]. 
 85. Better Response, supra note 84, at 36. 
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and levels of economic activity.86 This creates uncertainty in regards to 
the amount of greenhouse gases that will be emitted in a given year. 
Although there are no carbon tax proposals pending in the U.S. 
Senate, a number of such proposals have been introduced in the U.S. 
House of Representatives. These include the Save Our Climate Act of 
2009 (the “Save Our Climate Act”)87 and America’s Energy Security 
Trust Fund Act of 2009 (“AESTFA”).88 The Save Our Climate Act, 
which was introduced in the House on January 15, 2009, proposes to 
reduce CO2 emissions by amending the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
(the “Code”) to impose an upstream tax on “taxable fuels.”89 Under the 
bill, the term “taxable fuels” is defined to mean coal, natural gas, 
petroleum, and any petroleum product that is “extracted, manufactured 
or produced in the United States or entered into the United States for 
consumption, use, or warehousing.”90 The tax starts at $10 per ton of 
carbon content in the taxable fuel, increasing by $10 each year until the 
second year after CO2 emissions are reduced to 20% of 1990 levels.91 At 
that time, the tax will be frozen.92 The tax is to be imposed on 
manufacturers, producers and importers of taxable fuels at the time of 
sale.93 The bill does, however, provide certain tax credits and exemptions. 
These include a credit for embedded or sequestered carbon, as well as an 
exemption for exports.94  It should be noted that, unlike the cap-and-
trade programs described above, the bill does not set forth a separate 
enforcement scheme, and presumably, the enforcement provisions of the 
Code would apply. 
AESTFA, which was introduced in the House on March 5, 2009, is 
similar to the Save Our Climate Act. Like the Save Our Climate Act, 
AESTFA focuses on reducing CO2 and not any other greenhouse 
gas.95 It proposes to do so by amending the Code to impose an upstream 
 86. Policy Options, supra note 82, at ix. 
 87. Save Our Climate Act of 2009, H.R. 594, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 88. America’s Energy Security Trust Fund Act of 2009, H.R. 1337, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
 89. Save Our Climate Act, supra note 87, § 3(a). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. The use of a taxable fuel by a manufacturer, producer or importer of such 
fuel is treated as a sale for purposes of the bill. 
 94. Id. 
 95. AESTFA, supra note 88, § 2(a). 
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tax on “taxable carbon substances.”96 The term “taxable carbon 
substances” has the same definition as “taxable fuels.” The tax starts at 
$15 per ton of CO2 content of the taxable carbon substance, increasing 
each year by $10.97 Under AESTFA, EPA is required to set CO2 
emissions targets, which are to be designed so that, by 2050, carbon 
emissions are reduced to 20% of 2005 levels.98 If the emissions targets 
are not met for a particular year, the tax will increase by $15 instead of 
by $10.99 The tax is to be imposed on the same entities as the Save Our 
Climate Act, and like the Save Our Climate Act, AESTFA provides 
certain tax credits and exemptions. This includes a tax credit for 
“qualified offset projects.”100 AESTFA defines “qualified offset projects” to 
mean projects carried out in the United States that: (1) reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions, (2) sequester greenhouse gases, or (3) destroy HFCs.101 
AESTFA does not set forth a separate enforcement scheme. 
C.  Regulating Greenhouse Gases Under the Clean Air Act 
Aside from a new legislative framework, traditional regulation under 
the CAA may also be used to control greenhouse gases. Indeed, as a 
result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,102 EPA 
was required to make a determination whether to regulate greenhouse 
gases under the CAA.  In responding to this decision, EPA determined 
that greenhouse gases endanger public health and the environment and 
that emissions of greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles endanger 
public health and welfare under CAA Section 202(a).103  On April 1, 2010, 
EPA finalized the first greenhouse gas emission standards for motor 
vehicles under the CAA.104 
Recognizing that EPA has begun to regulate mobile sources of 
greenhouse gases under the CAA, this Article focuses on four provisions 
of the CAA that EPA could use, or could be compelled to use, to 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. While AESTFA does not explicitly provide that offset projects are entitled 
to a tax credit, offset projects are included in the “Refunds or Credits” section of the bill. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007). 
 103. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Section 202(a) of the Clean 
Air Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 66, 496 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
 104. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010). 
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undertake comprehensive regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from 
stationary sources.105  We review each of these provisions below. 
1.  Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Permits 
The PSD permit provision of CAA Section 165 is the most likely 
CAA provision to be used to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from 
stationary sources. In fact, because EPA has begun to regulate greenhouse 
gases from motor vehicles under Section 202, it is now required to 
regulate those same pollutants under the PSD program for “major 
stationary sources.”106 Major stationary sources are defined as those 
sources that emit more than 100 tons per year of any regulated pollutant 
or 250 tons per year of any combination of regulated pollutants.107 
The permits for sources exceeding these thresholds must contain 
emission limitations that meet best available control technology (“BACT”) 
standards.108 Under the PSD program, new major facilities and 
modification of existing major facilities require both preconstruction 
review and permits.109 
Some concerns have been expressed about using the PSD program to 
regulate greenhouse gases.  The primary concern is that the PSD thresholds, 
100 and 250 tons per year, are far too low for greenhouse gases and 
would be easily crossed by both major and minor emitters.110 For 
example, previously unregulated sources such as “large office and 
residential buildings, hotels, [and] large retail establishments” would 
likely be subjected to PSD permit requirements if thresholds were left 
unaltered.111 As such, the national administration of PSD permits would 
jump from between 200 and 300 per year into the thousands.112 Such an 
 105. For a general discussion of regulating greenhouse gases under the CAA, see 
the Bush Adminis tration’s Advanced Not ice of Prop osed Rulemaking “Regulating 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act,” 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (July 30, 2008). 
 106. 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2010). The PSD program applies to pollutants regulated 
under any Clean Air Act authority, except sections 112 and 211(o). 
 107. Id. § 7479. 
 108. Id. § 7475. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Brigham Daniels, Hannah Polikov, Timothy Profeta & James Salzman, 
Regulating Climate: What Role for the Clean Air Act?, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,837, 10,840 
(2009) [hereinafter Regulating Climate]. 
 111. Id. at 10,840 n.31. 
 112. EPA, Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR), 
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increase would likely create significant economic and logistical problems 
for those state environmental authorities responsible for imposing BACT 
standards on emitters. 
In response to these concerns, a number of potential solutions have 
been suggested.  EPA has tried to make clear that it will not immediately 
regulate stationary sources, and has published a revised timetable for 
industry compliance with greenhouse gas regulations.113 This timetable 
indicates that, during the first half of the 2011 calendar year, large 
stationary sources that are already regulated under the CAA for non-
greenhouse gas emissions must address greenhouse gases in their permit 
applications.114 Other large stationary sources will not have to address 
greenhouse gas emissions until the latter half of 2011.115 In addition, 
using the “Tailoring Rule,” EPA has declared that the PSD threshold 
will not be 100 or 250 tons per year, but instead 75,000 to 100,000 
tons of total greenhouse gases per year.116 It is important to note, 
however, that PSD regulation of greenhouse gases has aroused 
significant political opposition. It remains to be seen whether EPA’s 
attempts to tailor the PSD requirements to greenhouse gases will survive 
judicial and congressional scrutiny and whether EPA’s PSD authority 
over greenhouse gases will remain intact. 
2.  New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) 
Another provision that may be used to regulate greenhouse gases 
under the CAA is the Section 111 NSPS program. Under Section 111, 
EPA may divide stationary sources into a variety of categories, called 
source categories. EPA can compel sources in each category to adopt 
certain technologies or to reduce emissions levels “to the functional 
equivalent of installing such a technology.”117 Such limitations are based 
 113. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations  That Determine Pollutants 
Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010). See 
also Letter from Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Administrator, to Senator Jay D. Rockefeller, Senator 
from West Virginia (Feb. 22, 2010), available at http://epa.gov/oar/pdfs/LPJ_letter.pdf; 
Letter from Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Administrator, to Senator Lisa Murkowski, Senator from 
Alaska (Mar. 26, 2010), available at http://energytopic.nationaljournal.com/100326_jackson 
_to_murkowski.pdf. 
 114. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants 
Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004, at 17,007 (Apr. 2, 2010). 
 115. Id. 
 116. The legal foundation for the agency’s revision of the statutory threshold has, 
however, raised significant questions.  See, e.g., Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, at 31,533–49 (June 3, 
2010). 
 117. Regulating Climate, supra note 110, at 10,839. 
104 
 
SCHANG-CHA N VISUAL (DO NOT DELETE)  3/11/2016  1:31 PM 
[VOL. 2:  87, 2010]  Greenhouse Gas Control Options 
 SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
on best-demonstrated technology.118 EPA can also regulate existing 
sources by requiring states to evaluate their existing sources and submit 
a plan for regulating emitted pollutants.119 Regulation of existing sources 
is, however, restricted to those pollutants that are not already regulated 
by the NAAQS or NESHAP programs such as greenhouse gases.120 
The NSPS program is one of the preferred methods for regulating 
greenhouse gases under the CAA because it gives EPA a great deal 
of flexibility in defining source categories and in determining how each 
source category should be treated.121 The program gives the agency 
discretion to determine which sectors are regulatory priorities and how 
stringently each source category should be regulated.122 The agency may 
amend its source categories, thereby allowing it to distinguish between 
subsectors of a larger category or combine two similar sectors into one 
overarching category as a means of addressing both sources in a timely 
and cost-effective manner.123 This enables EPA to tailor its regulations 
to particular sectors of the economy, which in turn ensures that specific 
technological, economic, and environmental considerations are taken 
into account. One further benefit of the NSPS program is the flexibility 
it affords EPA in terms of ratcheting up the stringency of previously 
issued regulations.124 
While there are many characteristics of the NSPS program to 
recommend its use for the regulation of greenhouse gases, a shortcoming 
of this approach is the length of time it takes for regulations to be 
promulgated and implemented. On average, it takes EPA between 18 
months and two years to establish NSPS emission guidelines, and 
another one or two years before state-adopted standards are promulgated.125 
 118. Franz T. Litz & Nicholas M. Bianco, What to Expect From EPA: Regulation of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. LAW INST.) 
10,460, at 10,482 (2010) [hereinafter What to Expect]. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id.  The NAAQS and NESHAP programs are discussed in more detail below. 
 121. See EPA, T E CH NICA L SU PPORT D OCUME NT FO R TH E A D VANCED  N OTICE OF 
PROPOSED RULEMAKING FOR GREENHOUSE GASES; STATIONARY SOURCES, for a general 
discussion of how NSPS requirements might apply to greenhouse gas sources, available 
at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads /ANPRPreamble.pdf; see 
also Regulating Climate, supra note 110, at 10,839. 
 122. Id. 
 123. What to Expect, supra note 118, at 10,482. 
 124. Regulating Climate, supra note 110, at 10,839. 
 125. What to Expect, supra note 118, at 10,483. 
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Past experience has shown that most states allow emitters three years to 
come into compliance.126  
Due to the vast array of greenhouse gas emitting sources, it may take 
EPA a significant amount of time to methodically develop regulations 
for each of its source categories.127 Some categories will face regulation 
long before others.128 The unique nature of greenhouse gases—most of 
which result from the combustion of fuels—may, however, simplify 
implementation to some degree. The NSPS may be based on changing 
the type of fuel burned or by imposing energy efficiency standards. As 
such, NSPS for greenhouse gases may not be as cumbersome as 
traditional NSPS promulgation. 
An intriguing possibility is that EPA could establish a cap-and-trade 
program using CAA Section 111.  Indeed, there is some precedent for this: 
in 2005, EPA established a mercury trading program under Section 111. 
Although the program was struck down by the D.C. Circuit, the court’s 
decision was not based on grounds that called into question the 
permissibility of establishing trading under Section 111.129 Nevertheless, 
even if EPA were able to use NSPS to establish a greenhouse gas cap-
and-trade system, such a system could have several significant limitations. 
This includes an inability to allow trading between source categories and 
an inability to allow the use of offsets.130 Also, the time required to 
implement the program is an issue. While EPA started working on the 
mercury trading program in 2001, it has yet to implement the program, 
and even if EPA remains committed to the program, it appears that it 
could take several more years to implement. 
3.  National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) 
A third provision that may be used to regulate greenhouse gases under 
the CAA is the NAAQS program (CAA Sections 108-110). Under this 
program, EPA has the authority to identify criteria air pollutants and set 
limitations on the concentration of each pollutant in the ambient air.131 
The program was implemented in order to regulate air pollutants such as 
smog, whose concentrations were locally significant. As a result, the 
NAAQS program requires the ambient air quality in small geographic 
 126. Id. 
 127. Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 
44,354, at 44,368 (July 30, 2008). 
 128. Id. 
 129. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 578 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  Instead, the court ruled 
that EPA impermissibly removed mercury from regulation as a hazardous air pollutant 
under Section 112. 
 130. What to Expect, supra note 118, at 10,482. 
 131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–11 (2008). 
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areas within each state to be measured. Air quality is improved through 
the execution of state implementation plans (“SIPs”). 
While the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions is possible under the 
NAAQS program, such a regulatory scheme would have significant 
drawbacks.132 In contrast to the local pollutants that are typically regulated 
under the program, greenhouse gases are spread uniformly throughout 
the earth’s atmosphere.133 States would therefore find it next to 
impossible to reduce greenhouse gases within their airshed by merely 
employing a SIP.134 Also, if EPA did regulate greenhouse gases under 
the NAAQS program, it would not be able to regulate existing greenhouse 
gas sources under the NSPS program, which would strip that program of 
much of its utility as a greenhouse gas regulatory option.135  Although 
some commentators have proposed interesting methods for using 
NAAQS and SIPs to tackle climate change,136 the tools and nature of the 
program make it unlikely to be used by EPA to control greenhouse gas 
emissions.137 
  
 132. See generally Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 
73 Fed. Reg. at 44,367–68. 
 133. What to Expect, supra note 118, at 10,838. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Regulating Greenhouse Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 
at 44,485 (proposed July 30, 2008). 
 136. See, e.g., Thomas D. Peterson, Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. & John C. Dernbach, 
Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change Mitigation Policy in the United 
States: Integrating Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 
(ENVTL. LAW INST.) 10,711, at 10,733–34 (Aug. 2009).  But see, Robert Brenner & Anna 
Marie Wood, Comment on Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change 
Mitigation Policy in the United States: Integrating Levels of Government and Economic 
Sectors, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. LAW INST.) 10,723 (Aug. 2009); Michael Gerrard, 
Comment on Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change Mitigation Policy in 
the United States: Integrating Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 39 ENVTL. L. 
REP. (EN VTL .  LA W  IN ST.) 10,727 (Aug. 2009); Gary Guzy, Comment on Developing 
a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change Mitigation Policy in the United States: 
Integrating Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. LAW 
INST.) 10,730 (Aug. 2009); Raymond B. Ludwiszewski & Charles H. Haake, Comment on 
Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change Mitigation Policy in the United 
States: Integrating Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. 
LAW INST.) 10,732 (Aug. 2009). 
 137. See Robin Bravender, Groups Back Petition to Spur National CO2 Standard, 
GREENWIRE, Dec. 21, 2009 (quoting EPA Administrator Jackson as saying she and EPA have 
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It is nonetheless conceivable that EPA could be compelled to use the 
NAAQS program through a combination of petitions and lawsuits from 
third parties. In fact, several environmental groups have petitioned EPA 
to take this approach.138 And, EPA was compelled to regulate lead under 
the NAAQS program despite significant Agency reluctance.139  
4.  National Emission Standards for Hazardous                                          
Air Pollutants (NESHAP) 
A fourth option for regulating greenhouse gases under the CAA is the 
NESHAP program (CAA Section 112).  This program enables EPA to 
list pollutants that create “a threat of adverse human health effects” or 
harmful environmental impacts.140 If EPA lists one or more greenhouse 
gas under Section 112, it must also list all categories of major sources.141 
Under this provision, major sources are defined as those sources that 
emit or may potentially emit 10 tons per year of any one hazardous air 
pollutant or 25 tons per year of any combination of hazardous air 
pollutants.142 Any pollutants that EPA lists under this program must be 
treated by maximum achievable control technology standards.143 
Like NAAQS, the NESHAP program is an unlikely regulatory path 
for controlling greenhouse gases from stationary sources.144  This is 
because “[S]ection 112 ‘appears to allow EPA little flexibility regarding 
either the source categories to be regulated or the size of the sources to 
regulate . . . EPA would be required to regulate a very large number of 
new and existing stationary sources, including smaller stationary 
sources.’”145 In addition, the NESHAP program requires new sources 
to come into compliance immediately and existing sources to come into 
compliance within three to four years, which leaves little time for 
technological innovation.146 
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that relying on traditional CAA 
regulation is not the ideal option for controlling greenhouse gases. In the 
absence of a federal legislative framework, it may, however, be the only 
available option. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Nat’l Res. Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 324 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 140. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(2). 
 141. Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, supra note 135, at 
44,368. 
 142. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See generally Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 
supra note 135. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
108 
 
SCHANG-CHA N VISUAL (DO NOT DELETE)  3/11/2016  1:31 PM 
[VOL. 2:  87, 2010]  Greenhouse Gas Control Options 
 SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
II.  COMPARING ENFORCEMENT ASPECTS OF CONTROL OPTIONS 
Given the numerous options for regulating greenhouse gases, it is 
important to assess each of these options. The most important criterion 
in this assessment is environmental effectiveness—whether the option 
results in the desired emissions reductions. Other factors are important 
as well, such as the efficiency of the option and its likely durability in 
the face of changing circumstances. As summarized in Table 1, in this 
section we compare several aspects of enforcement that will impact the 
effectiveness of the various greenhouse gas control options.  This 
comparison suggests that, while many proposed programs have the main 
elements in place to be effectively enforced, all have some weaknesses that 
may hinder their ultimate environmental effectiveness. 
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS OF GREENHOUSE 














* Monitoring, reporting and verification. 
**  A theoretical CAA Section 111 cap-and-trade system created by EPA 
using its final rule for Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases as a  
model of the monitoring, reporting and verification requirements. 
A.  Regulatory Complexity 
The various greenhouse gas control options differ in their regulatory 
complexity.  Among the options, Waxman-Markey, which splits regulatory 
authority among four federal agencies, creates several new administrative 
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bodies and calls for 145 new rulemakings, is the most complex. This 
will likely give rise to some enforcement challenges.  While Kerry-
Lieberman has a similar regulatory structure to Waxman-Markey, it 
takes a different approach to certain key issues, rendering it more 
manageable. Compared to Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman, 
Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax proposals offer less complexity, but 
this comes at the cost of reduced flexibility for regulated entities in 
meeting their compliance obligations.  At the same time, it is not yet clear 
how complex regulation will be under the CAA, as this will depend in 
large part on how EPA decides to implement a greenhouse gas program 
under the statute. 
Regulatory complexity is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, a 
highly complex program may result in a more efficient system. For 
example, by creating an almost economy-wide approach to greenhouse 
gas controls, a highly complex cap-and-trade program may allow trading 
across sectors and offsets to be used, thus decreasing implementation 
costs for the regulated community.  At the same time, such complexity 
gives rise to numerous implementation and enforcement problems.  
Program design must, therefore, strike a balance between complexity, 
flexibility, and ability to implement. In considering regulatory complexity, 
we evaluate two different elements: (1) agency expertise and coordination; 
and (2) the amount of time and resources needed to implement the 
program. 
1.  Agency Expertise and Coordination 
The expertise of the agency selected to implement a greenhouse gas 
program will affect the enforcement and effectiveness of that program.  
A review of the various greenhouse gas control options reveals that 
some questionable decisions have been made in regards to which agency 
will implement them. Among the various options, Waxman-Markey is 
the most problematic. The bill bears the scars of its passage in the House 
of Representatives: in order to mollify certain concerns over committee 
jurisdiction and EPA control over agricultural interests, the bill’s sponsors 
gave significant roles to USDA and FERC. As a result, Waxman-Markey 
splits authority to oversee the greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program 
among four federal agencies: EPA, USDA, FERC and CFTC. Each 
agency is charged with regulating a different aspect of the program. The 
EPA is in charge of distributing emission allowances and managing the 
offsets program, except that the portion of the offsets program relating to 
domestic agricultural and forestry sources is to be managed by USDA. 
At the same time, regulation of the emission allowance and offset credit 
market is to be overseen by two other federal agencies, FERC and CFTC. 
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The role assigned to FERC is highly problematic. At present, FERC is 
responsible for regulating the interstate transmission of natural gas, oil, 
and electricity, as well as regulating natural gas and hydroelectric 
projects.147 This is a stark contrast to the role that FERC would be 
playing under Waxman-Markey, where it will be required to regulate the 
greenhouse gas allowance market—a commodity market among industries 
that span the U.S. economy. While the energy industry is likely to be 
highly involved in the market, many participants will not be in this 
industry. Thus, there is no clear fit between FERC’s expertise and its 
oversight of a national greenhouse gas market. Indeed, the Chairman of 
FERC has himself publicly questioned whether his agency is well-suited 
to regulating this market.148 
In addition, the prominent role given to USDA in implementing the 
agricultural and forestry offset program under Waxman-Markey is 
highly problematic.149 USDA has traditionally viewed farmers as its 
“constituents,”150 and has stated that part of its mission is to promote the 
economic well-being of farmers and expand their markets.151 The vision 
of USDA is “to be recognized as a dynamic organization that is able to 
efficiently provide the integrated program delivery needed to lead a 
rapidly evolving food and agriculture system.”152 Under Waxman-
Markey, USDA is in charge of determining the environmental sufficiency 
of agricultural and forestry offsets. Query whether an agency focused on 
supporting and promoting the American farmer would have the motivation 
and expertise to design, implement and enforce an environmentally 
rigorous offset system that promised to lavish billions of dollars on its 
“constituents.” While it is true that USDA has more expertise in farming 
 147. FERC, About FERC—What FERC Does, http://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does. 
asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2010). 
 148. Peter Behr, FERC: An Energy Overseer May Have the Clout to Umpire Emissions 
Trading, CLIMATEWIRE, Apr. 2, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2009/04/02/ 
archive/8. 
 149. Christa Marshall, Offsets: New Ag Language in Climate Bill Riles Enviro Groups, 
CLIMATEWIRE, June 26, 2009,  http://www.pacificforest.org/news/Media%20Clips%20PDF/ 
Climatewire-ACES-6-26-09.pdf; Allison Winter, Farm Groups Prevail as House Bill Puts 
USDA in Charge of Ag Offsets, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/cwire/2009/06/24/24climatewire-farm-groups-p revail-as -house-climate-bill-p u-
24287.ht ml. 
 150. See generally USDA, www.usda.gov (last visited Oct. 31, 2010). 
 151. See USDA Mission Statement, http://www.usda.gov/wps/p ort al/usda/usdahome 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2010). 
 152. Id. 
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than EPA, USDA does not have a solid track record of determining the 
sufficiency of environmental programs, which EPA does. There is a 
significant risk that the integrity of the U.S. offset system could be called 
into question should EPA and USDA take significantly different approaches 
to creating offsets or should one agency be viewed as inadequately 
ensuring the environmental integrity of offsets. 
Although Kerry-Lieberman takes a largely similar approach to agency 
authority as Waxman-Markey, there are certain differences between the 
two bills that may offer some solutions for the split in authority among 
agencies. To start, Kerry-Lieberman does not give FERC any authority 
to oversee the greenhouse gas market, but places oversight of the market 
solely into the hands of the agency expert in market regulation: CFTC.153 
This will likely improve implementation and enforcement of the 
program. At the same time, Kerry-Lieberman takes a somewhat different 
approach to the split authority under the domestic offsets program. 
While EPA and USDA are still responsible for different aspects of the 
program, the two agencies are required to jointly establish the program.154 
This includes jointly selecting an advisory committee to provide scientific 
and technical advice regarding the domestic offsets program, as well as 
jointly promulgating regulations to implement the program.155 This 
approach could go a long way in ameliorating concerns about two separate 
sets of regulations. It does, however, leave some room for concern 
because enforcement will still be left in the hands of each agency. As a 
result, it is still possible that one agency could demand strict compliance 
with the regulations while the other took a more permissive approach. 
The other greenhouse control options also make some questionable 
decisions in regards to implementing agencies. Cantwell-Collins gives 
oversight of its greenhouse gas program to Treasury. While it makes 
some sense to draw on Treasury’s expertise in collecting taxes and 
regulating financial markets and instruments, Treasury has no prior 
experience with implementing pollution control programs. It is troublesome 
that Treasury will need to evaluate the environmental effectiveness of 
carbon capture and storage, reinjection facilities, and carbon embedded 
in manufactured products, as well as investigate and account for leakage, 
verify additionality, and make other technical decisions about the offset 
program. This is also true of the carbon tax proposals, which give the 
IRS—a bureau of Treasury—authority over their greenhouse gas programs. 
While the IRS is a logical choice to collect taxes, query whether the 
 153. Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, § 2402(a)(2). 
 154. Id. § 733(a)(1)(A). 
 155. Id. §§ 732(a)(1), 732(b), 733(a)(1)(B). 
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agency will be able to oversee the environmental effectiveness of the 
offsets envisioned under AESTFA. 
In addition to agency expertise, agency coordination is an important 
aspect of enforcement. Coordination is required to ensure that each 
agency receives the information that it needs to carry out its responsibilities. 
This is likely to be an issue under Waxman-Markey. Although each of 
the four implementing agencies is given a distinct role in regulating the 
greenhouse gas program, the agencies will likely need to establish 
information-sharing protocols and enter into memoranda of understanding 
in order to properly coordinate their roles. For instance, FERC and 
CFTC will need information from EPA regarding distribution of emission 
allowances, as well as certification of offset credits in order to properly 
regulate the emission allowance and offset credit market. At the same 
time, coordination is needed to ensure that the program is consistently 
administered. Waxman-Markey requires each agency to promulgate its 
own regulations. Although the bill sets forth general requirements for 
these regulations, the details are largely left to each agency’s discretion. 
This may lead to regulations being inconsistently promulgated and 
enforced.156 
Kerry-Lieberman addresses some of these issues by explicitly requiring 
the implementing agencies to coordinate their activities. Specifically, the 
bill requires various federal agencies, including EPA, USDA and CFTC, 
to enter into a memorandum of understanding within one year after 
Kerry-Lieberman is enacted in order to establish procedures to, among 
other things, “share information that may be requested for enforcement, 
surveillance, or such other purposes within the scope of the jurisdiction 
of the requesting agency.”157 Although the agencies will still need to 
work out the details of any information sharing, requiring the agencies to 
complete this work by a date certain will likely facilitate coordination 
among the various agencies and, in turn, simplify enforcement. 
 156. Waxman-Markey does attempt to provide some coordination among the agencies.  
For example, under Section 531 of the bill, the advisory committee for USDA offsets 
program is required to “coordinate its activities with those of any other [f]ederal advisory 
committees working in related areas” and to “consult with, and be informed by the views 
of” the advisory committee for EPA offsets program.  These provisions presumably provide 
an opportunity for USDA to coordinate some of its offset program activities with those 
of EPA, but the details have been left to the agencies to determine.  These details will need to 
be worked out and put in place in order to ensure proper coordination and, in turn, proper 
enforcement of the cap-and-trade program. 
 157. Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, § 2415. 
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Cantwell-Collins further simplifies enforcement of a greenhouse gas 
control program by placing its administration largely into the hands of 
one agency. As noted above, the Secretary is in charge of establishing a 
program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.158 The Secretary is also 
required to, among other things, conduct periodic auctions of the 
allowances,159 distribute allowances for certain offset activities,160 and—
in consultation with CFTC, FERC and the FTC—promulgate regulations 
to establish, operate, and oversee any derivatives markets.161 The advantage 
of this approach is that, unlike Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman, 
it does not split administration of the program among several agencies. It 
is therefore less likely that there will be issues of coordination or 
inconsistency in promulgating and enforcing regulations—issues that are 
likely to arise under Waxman-Markey and, to a lesser extent, Kerry-
Lieberman. 
Similar to Cantwell-Collins, the carbon tax proposals and regulation 
under the CAA also rely on one implementing agency. This will 
decrease coordination issues significantly. Compared to a carbon tax, 
however, traditional CAA authority is more complex, because state 
agencies are involved in implementing and enforcing these programs. 
Because states must align their programs with any changes made at the 
federal level, there is often a significant time delay in translating federal 
mandates into on-the-ground requirements.162 Further, there may be 
disputes between EPA and states over regulatory interpretation, stringency 
of standards and enforcement matters.163 
2.  Amount of Time and Resources to Implement 
The amount of time and resources needed to implement a greenhouse 
gas control program affects the enforcement and effectiveness of that 
program. Indeed, the more time and resources needed to create the 
program, the more opportunity there will be for disruptions in the 
implementation process from such factors as litigation and lack of 
 158. Cantwell-Collins, supra note 33, § 4(a)(1). 
 159. Id. § 4(b)(1). 
 160. Id. § 4(c). 
 161. Id. § 4(b)(8)(B). 
 162. See, e.g., Robin Bravender, EPA Tailoring Rule Creates Challenge for State 
Regulations, GREENWIRE, June 2, 2010 (some states likely unable to modify regulations 
to comply with EPA GHG rule within one year). 
 163. For example, EPA has had an ongoing dispute with Texas over the stringency 
of its air permitting program.  See Naureen S. Malik, EPA Rejects Texas Flexible Air-Quality 
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sufficient resources. In considering this aspect, there is a stark difference 
among the various greenhouse gas control options. 
To start, Waxman-Markey is likely to require the most amount of time 
and resources to implement. The bill is by far the most complex and 
detailed of the pending legislative proposals.164 To implement its 
greenhouse gas reduction provisions, EPA alone would need to undertake 
at least 33 rulemakings.165  EPA rulemakings often take several years to 
be worked into final rules, which then face several additional years of 
court challenges.  And, once all judicial review is complete, it will take 
many years to actually implement these provisions. This regulatory 
structure, which is largely the same for Kerry-Lieberman, is likely to lead 
to significant implementation challenges. 
In contrast to Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman, Cantwell-Collins 
offers a more simple approach. It avoids many of the most controversial 
and complex aspects of the other cap-and-trade bills by limiting the 
number of sources regulated and focusing on just carbon, not several 
greenhouse gases. In addition, it has a more streamlined regulatory 
approach, including limited opportunities to utilize offsets. Still, 
Cantwell-Collins requires a new regulatory structure within Treasury. 
This will take time and will likely face litigation challenges.  Accordingly, 
while Cantwell-Collins’ regulatory structure is likely to lead to less 
implementation challenges than Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman, 
it does not eliminate all of them. 
The carbon tax proposals will likely require the least amount of time 
and resources to implement. Unlike the cap-and-trade approaches, 
implementation of a carbon tax will not require new regulatory structures. 
For example, many of the entities that would be covered under an 
upstream tax like that proposed in the Save Our Climate Act and 
AESTFA are already subject to excise taxes.166 The same structures that 
are used for collecting excise taxes could also be used for collecting 
 164. See Michael Gerrard, Refining the Challenge in Implementing Carbon Policy, 
40 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. LAW INST.) 10,579, at 10,581 (2010). 
 165. Id. at 10,582. 
 166. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, POLICY OPTIONS FOR REDUCING CO2 EMISSIONS 
xiii (2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8934/02-12-Carbon.pdf. 
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carbon taxes.167  Utilizing existing structures would simplify implementation 
and enforcement.168   
The one exception is that AESTFA allows a refund or credit for 
“qualified offset projects.”  The bill does not, however, set forth any 
requirements related to those projects.  In fact, other than defining what 
a “qualified offset project” is, the only other guidance that AESTFA 
provides with respect to such projects is that the Secretary must, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Energy, “conduct a study and submit a 
report to Congress of qualified offset projects” within one year after 
AESTFA is enacted.169 The details of any such program are left to 
Treasury to determine.  Thus, instead of regulatory complexity, AESTFA 
has so few details as to leave regulators with seemingly unfettered 
discretion, which is a concern in itself. 
The amount of time and resources required to implement greenhouse 
gas controls under the CAA will be significant, although this will depend 
heavily on how EPA chooses to implement such a program.  Even 
though there is an existing regulatory system in place for permitting and 
enforcement, if the existing PSD program were to come into force for 
greenhouse gases without the Tailoring Rule taking effect, tens of 
thousands of additional sources would be subject to regulation by 
EPA and the states. Attempting to create BACT for such a large 
number of sources could be a significant resource drain, would be 
extremely time intensive, would greatly burden state agencies, and may 
not be effective at reducing emissions.170  Many states have noted that 
even with the Tailoring Rule, application of PSD requirements to 
sources that emit more than 75,000 tons of greenhouse gases per year 
will require a significant investment of time and resources.171 
Overall, none of the greenhouse gas control options present a simple 
approach. Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman will require a herculean 
effort by all of the federal and state agencies involved in implementing 
and overseeing the program, which will likely translate into significant 
time delays.  In an era of extreme budget deficits and a widely embraced 
desire to reduce federal spending, it is unclear whether the political will 
 167. Id.; see also Carbon T ax Cent er, Introduction, http://www.carbontax.org/ 
introduction (last visited Oct. 31, 2010). 
 168. Roberta F. Mann, The Case for the Carbon Tax: How to Overcome Politics and 
Find Our Green Destiny, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. LAW INST.) 10,118, at 10,120 (2009). 
 169. AESTFA, supra note 88, § 4692(b). 
 170. There are, however, tools that may cushion or avoid some of these concerns. EPA 
could put limits on, or issue new interpretations of, sources’ “potential to emit” or streamline 
the permitting of traditionally minor sources by issuing general permits.  EPA, supra note 112.   
 171. See EPA, State and Local Permitting Authority Responses to Tailoring Rule 
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exists to undertake such a substantial governmental effort.  Even if the 
costs of the programs are funded by proceeds from the auction of emission 
credits, creation of what can be seen as a large bureaucracy to implement 
these programs comes at a time when the public is increasingly unwilling to 
subsidize government programs.  Ironically, the long-heralded “market 
mechanism” of cap-and-trade may itself be too weighty a regulatory 
program to take flight in this political atmosphere.  At the same time, 
more streamlined approaches like a carbon tax face tremendous political 
hurdles because of opposition to taxes, and will not bring the lower costs 
to regulated entities promised by the investment in regulatory complexity.  
And relying on traditional CAA authority brings the potential for 
significant complexity, litigation delay, and higher costs to the regulated 
community as well. 
B.  Number and Variety of Sources 
While there is no simple relationship between enforcement and the 
number and variety of sources regulated, experience with previous cap-
and-trade programs suggests that subjecting increased numbers and 
types of sources to regulation will impede enforcement.  Taking this into 
account, it appears that, among the various options, Waxman-Markey, 
Kerry-Lieberman, and traditional CAA regulation will face the most 
significant enforcement challenges.  In contrast, Cantwell-Collins and the 
carbon tax proposals will likely face less enforcement challenges since 
they cover not only a smaller number, but also a smaller variety of 
sources. 
The number and variety of sources regulated under the various 
greenhouse gas control programs will affect how effectively these 
programs can be in enforced.  In general, the costs and complexity of 
administering a greenhouse gas control program increase as the number 
and variety of regulated sources increase.172 This in turn may increase 
the potential for non-compliance.  It should be noted, however, that in 
certain circumstances an increased number and variety of sources may 
facilitate compliance among regulated entities.  For example, adding 
 172. See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN EVALUATION OF CAP-AND-TRADE 
PROGRAMS FOR REDUCING U.S. CARBON EMISSIONS viii–ix (2001), available at http://www. 
cbo.gov/ftpdocs/28xx/doc2876/CapTrade.pdf (analyzing four proposed plans based on 
their ease of imp lementation, carbon-target certainty, increment al-cost certainty, cost 
effectiveness, and distributional effects). 
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more sources that are authorized to trade in a greenhouse gas market will 
likely increase flexibility, allow lower-cost sources to trade, and generally 
decrease the overall cost of greenhouse gas emission credits.  Expanding 
the pool of regulated entities also allows industries to share the regulatory 
burden, as some industries will experience technological breakthroughs 
earlier than others.  By helping to create a lower cost to comply, this 
may ease the enforcement burden on agencies and regulated entities, 
resulting in greater environmental effectiveness. 
Experience with previous cap-and-trade programs nevertheless suggests 
that—overall—a larger number and variety of sources can impede 
enforcement.  Indeed, the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market 
(“RECLAIM”) program illustrates this.  RECLAIM is a regional cap-
and-trade program that was adopted by the South Coast Air Quality 
Management District in 1993 in order to reduce SOx and NOx emissions 
from certain stationary sources in the South Coast Air Basin.173 The 
sources regulated under RECLAIM are “more heterogeneous than those 
of the Acid Rain Program, including not only power plants, but also 
refineries, asphalt, and cement  producers.”174 As noted by McAllister, the 
heterogeneity of sources regulated under RECLAIM has led to some 
difficulty in tracking emissions.  In fact, “[b]ecause RECLAIM included 
many different types and sizes of industries, the data required to be 
submitted by [regulated entities] varied widely.  Efforts to automate data 
submission and verification were hindered by the lack of uniformity.”175 
The heterogeneity of sources has therefore resulted in some enforcement 
issues. 
Experience under the Acid Rain Program also suggests that large 
numbers and variety of sources will impede enforcement.  EPA’s 
experience with the program suggests that it takes a deep understanding 
of the regulated sources, large investments of time and staff to work with 
regulated sources, and detailed explanations of the program requirements to 
achieve high levels of compliance: 
The high levels of data quality and source compliance were not attained from the 
outset of the programs.  Rather, they were achieved through several years of 
careful program implementation, working closely and cooperatively with the regulated 
community. The authors believe that in order for a cap-and-trade program to 
succeed, it is essential that the monitoring, reporting, and verification [MRV] quality 
 173. EPA, EPA’S EVALUATION OF THE RECLAIM PROGRAM IN THE SOUTH COAST AIR 
QUALITY M ANAGEMENT DISTRICT, available at http://www.epa.gov/region9/air/reclaim/ 
index.html. See also Beyond Playing Banker, supra note 14, at 287–88. 
 174. Beyond Playing Banker, supra note 14, at 288. 
 175. Id. at 298, 301. 
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assurance/quality control elements of the program be based on principles that 
foster the development and maintenance of a strong program.176 
Based on this, it seems that increasing the number and variety of sources 
in a cap-and-trade program will make it more difficult to enforce the 
program.177 
Taking into account the number and variety of sources regulated under 
the various greenhouse gas control options, it is likely that enforcement 
will be simpler under certain of the options than others.  It is estimated 
that about 7,500 entities will be regulated under Waxman-Markey and 
Kerry-Lieberman.178 Such sources include a variety of upstream and 
downstream sources of greenhouse gases, including electricity sources, 
greenhouse gas importers, and various types of stationary sources.179 In 
contrast to Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman, Cantwell-Collins 
and the carbon tax proposals would regulate only upstream sources of 
greenhouse gases.  This would reduce the number of regulated entities 
from 7,500 to approximately 2,000 sources, which is comparable to the 
number of entities that are currently regulated under the Acid Rain 
Program.180 In addition, the entities that would be regulated under an 
upstream approach are more homogeneous than those that would be 
regulated under Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman.  It is therefore 
likely that enforcement, including the ability to determine compliance, 
would be much more straightforward under Cantwell-Collins and the 
carbon tax proposals. 
 176. Fundamentals, supra note 8, at 1577. 
 177. Even if the number and variety of sources can be managed by regulators, it will 
take a significant and long-term commitment of resources from all levels of government 
to achieve the same degree of attention, and therefore levels of compliance, from the regulated 
community as under the Acid Rain Program. It remains to be seen, however, whether 
Congress, future administrations, and the states will be willing to provide implementing 
agencies with the necessary resources to meet the program’s needs.  This poses a significant 
risk to the effective implementation and enforcement of the program. See generally id.  
(discussing the EPA’s implementation of the Acid Rain Program and NOx Budget Trading 
Programs using several fundamental monitoring, reporting, and verification elements). 
 178. SUMMARY OF THE AMERICAN POWER ACT 5 (2010), available at http://kerry. 
senat e.gov/imo/media/doc/APAShort Summary 1.pdf; see also M ARK HOLT ET AL., 
GREENHOUSE GAS LEGISLATION: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF H.R. 2454 AS PASSED BY 
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 84 (Congressional Research Service 2009). 
 179. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 700(13); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, 
§ 700(12). 
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It is difficult to predict the number of sources that might be regulated 
under traditional CAA authority.  A CAA Section 111 trading program 
would likely result in roughly the same number and variety of sources as 
under Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman.  As such, it would likely 
need significant resources to be administered effectively.  Imposition of 
the PSD program in its current form—without the narrowing effect of 
the Tailoring Rule—could result in tens of thousands of sources being 
regulated under the program.  This could pose significant administrative, 
enforcement and compliance difficulties for EPA, the states and the 
regulated community. 
Taken together, the relationship between the number and variety of 
sources and enforcement is not straightforward. Although adding sources 
to a cap-and-trade program may increase flexibility and ultimately improve 
compliance, experience with RECLAIM and the Acid Rain Program 
suggests that implementing Waxman-Markey, Kerry-Lieberman or any of 
the traditional CAA approaches will take a significant, long-term 
investment of resources and political will to have a chance at success.  
The charm of Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax proposals is their 
more narrow focus, but they come at a higher cost to the regulated 
community. 
C.  Monitoring, Reporting and Verification 
The various greenhouse gas control options take different approaches 
to monitoring, reporting and verification. Waxman-Markey, Kerry-
Lieberman, and the traditional CAA programs all have detailed monitoring, 
reporting, and verification requirements that will likely support their 
successful implementation.  In contrast, Cantwell-Collins and the carbon 
tax proposals fail to specify any of these requirements.  This gives rise to 
some significant concerns about whether these programs’ ultimate 
monitoring, reporting, and verification requirements will be sufficient. 
Monitoring, reporting and verification are key components of an 
effective enforcement system.181 Without these components, regulated 
entities would have little incentive to comply with emission targets, 
making it unlikely that environmental objectives would be met.  These 
components also facilitate transparency, citizen confidence and citizen 
enforcement, while building trust in the veracity of the program.  Indeed, 
 181. See, e.g., JAY SHIMSHACK, M ONITORING, ENFORCEMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
COMPLIANCE: UNDERSTANDING SPECIFIC AND GENERAL DETERRENCE (2007) available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/compliance/research/meec-whitepaper.pdf 
[hereinafter Understanding Deterrence]; Fundamentals,  supra  not e 8, at  1578 
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as demonstrated by the Toxics Release Inventory (“TRI”), making 
information on environmental releases publicly available can effectively 
encourage emissions reductions independently of regulation.182 This 
occurs not only through increased community pressure, but also through 
increased awareness within the source’s management about emissions.183 
The degree to which the TRI experience can be replicated with greenhouse 
gases remains to be seen, however, given that greenhouse gases pose a 
global, not local, risk and may not attract the same level of scrutiny as 
traditional pollutants. 
As can be seen from Table 2, both Waxman-Markey and Kerry-
Lieberman take a similar approach to monitoring, reporting and verification 
of greenhouse gas emissions. Under this approach, EPA must issue 
regulations that require regulated entities to submit data to EPA “sufficient 
to ensure compliance with or implementation of the requirements” of the  
bill.184  This includes data on greenhouse gas emissions; the production 
and importation of fuels and gases that may result in greenhouse gas 
emissions; and the capture and sequestration of greenhouse gases.185 
These data must be based on a continuous monitoring system, such as 
CEMS, or on an alternative system or methodology that is shown to 
provide data with the same precision and reliability as a continuous 
monitoring system.186 
  
 182. See generally LINDA K. BREGGIN AND READ D. PORTER, APPLICABILITY OF THE 
T O XICS RE LE ASE IN VENTO RY TO  N A NOMATE RIAL S 4 (2008) (finding general,  but  
not unanimous, agreement that TRI has been a success). 
 183. See Archon Fung & Dara O’Rourke, Reinventing Environmental Regulation 
from the Grassroots Up: Explaining and Expanding the Success of the Toxics Release 
Inventory, 25 ENVTL. M GMT. 115 (2000). 
 184. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 700(b)(1)(B); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 
32, § 700(b)(1)(B). 
 185. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 700(b)(1)(A); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 
32, § 700(b)(1)(A). 
 186. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 700(b)(1)(G); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 
32, § 700(b)(1)(G). 
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*  FERC applies for Waxman-Markey only. 
**  No domestic offset verification reports are available to the public 
under Kerry-Lieberman. Agriculture and forestry offset verification 
reports are unavailable to the public under Waxman-Markey. 
***  A theoretical CAA Section 111 cap-and-trade system created by EPA 
using its final rule for Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases as a 
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Although it is unclear how EPA will implement these requirements, 
EPA has published its final rule for Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse 
Gases.187 The rule establishes mandatory greenhouse gas reporting 
requirements for approximately thirty sources of greenhouse gases, 
including owners and operators of facilities that directly emit greenhouse 
gases and certain suppliers of fossil fuels and greenhouse gases.188 EPA 
anticipates that the rule will apply to about 10,000 facilities that are 
responsible for approximately 85% of the total U.S. greenhouse gas 
emissions.189  While this rule was developed independently of Waxman-
Markey and Kerry-Lieberman, it provides a good indication of the sort 
of regulations that EPA would likely promulgate under a national cap-
and-trade program.  This rule suggests that entities that are already required 
to collect and report data using CEMS under a separate program will be 
required to directly measure their emissions.  Other entities will have a 
choice of using either CEMS or facility-specific greenhouse gas 
calculations set forth in the rule.  Calculations used to estimate missing 
emissions data also vary by source.190 Although this approach is similar 
to the approach taken under the Acid Rain Program, it is important to 
keep in mind that the number and variety of sources regulated under 
Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman will be almost four times greater 
than under the Acid Rain Program.  As discussed above, this is likely to 
make enforcement more complicated. 
Unlike Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman, Cantwell-Collins does 
not explicitly set out any monitoring, reporting, or verification requirements 
for greenhouse gas emissions.  Under the bill, the Secretary is required to 
establish a program within the Treasury to reduce greenhouse gas  
 187. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260 
(proposed Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 40 CFR Parts 86, 87, 89, 90, 94, 98, 1033, 
1039, 1042, 1045, 1048, 1051, 1054, 1065). 
 188. Id. at 56,377. 
 189. Press Release, EPA, EPA Finalizes the Nation’s First Greenhouse Gas Reporting  
System/M onit oring t o Begin in 2010 (Sept. 22, 2009) available at http://yosemite.epa. 
gov/opa/admp ress .nsf/d985312f6895893b852574ac005f1e40/194e412153fcffea852576 
3900530d75!OpenDocument. 
 190. 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, at 56,280. Under the rule, reporting entities are required to 
submit annual reports to EPA that include, among other things, the entities’ annual greenhouse 
gas emissions as well as a certification from a designated representative affirming that 
the statements and information included in the report are true, accurate and complete.  Id. 
The rule requires self-certification with EPA emissions verification. Id. at 56,282. Data 
submitted under the rule will be made available to the public. Id. at 56,359. 
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emissions.191 This program would presumably contain monitoring, 
reporting, and verification requirements. It is important to note nonetheless 
that, even after monitoring, reporting, and verification requirements are 
put in place, Treasury is likely to still need some time, particularly in the 
initial stages of the program, to gain experience with administering a 
cap-and-trade program. 
Nevertheless, monitoring, reporting, and verification are likely to be 
less complicated under Cantwell-Collins than under Waxman-Markey 
and Kerry-Lieberman: not only are there fewer entities to regulate, but 
the 2,000 entities that are to be regulated already monitor and report 
fossil fuel sales to the government “for tax and other purposes.”192 
Annual reporting requirements are therefore unlikely to impose significant 
additional administrative burden.  As a result, after Treasury gains 
experience in administering the program, monitoring, reporting and 
verification are likely to be more straightforward. 
At the same time, it should be noted that it is unlikely Treasury will 
require the same kind of monitoring, reporting, or verification 
traditionally set forth in environmental regulations. This is due in large 
part to the nature of the Cantwell-Collins trading program, which trades 
on tons of fossil carbon, not greenhouse gas emissions or CO2 
equivalence.  The regulations promulgated under Cantwell-Collins 
will likely use sales data and carbon-content factors to calculate the 
amount of carbon shares that a first seller needs to comply.  Thus, while 
the other bills’ reporting requirements would create an inventory of 
greenhouse gas emissions, Cantwell-Collins could create a national map 
of carbon input into the economy.193 
The carbon tax proposals do not set forth a separate enforcement 
scheme, including monitoring, reporting and verification requirements, 
and would presumably rely on the enforcement mechanisms of the U.S. 
federal income tax system.  To a large extent, this system depends on 
“voluntarily compliance,” whereby taxpayers are required to independently 
assess and report their tax obligations to the IRS.194  The Code provides 
a number of “incentives” for taxpayers to comply, most of which involve 
punishing noncompliance.195 The IRS also depends on the threat of audit 
 191. Cantwell-Collins, supra note 33, § 4(a)(1). 
 192. Meaningful, supra note 72, at 313. 
 193. As discussed in more detail in the next section, this would not replace the need 
for a national inventory of greenhouse gas emissions.  As also discussed below, it remains 
unclear if this information would be available to the public. 
 194. Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms  and Enforcement in 
Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1455 (2003) [hereinafter Interplay]. Lederman 
points out that, “for many taxpayers, compliance is not truly voluntary.”  Id. at 1455 n.6. 
 195. Id. at 1456. 
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to encourage compliance.196  Relying on these enforcement mechanisms 
has the benefit of using established regulatory roles and familiar tools.  
Fairly minimal monitoring, reporting and verification requirements 
would be needed to implement a carbon tax, and would seemingly not 
need to be any more complicated than for other excise taxes.197 And, like 
the Cantwell-Collins program, the information gathered from a carbon 
tax would provide information on the flow of carbon into the economy if 
made publicly available. 
EPA’s CAA regulations have a highly developed set of enforcement 
provisions that rely on extensive monitoring, reporting, recordkeeping, 
and inspections. Promulgating monitoring, reporting and verification 
requirements for greenhouse gases under the NSPS and PSD programs 
would, like a carbon tax, likely follow existing requirements using 
existing agencies.  Although these provisions are largely settled and well 
understood, they are likely to be time consuming and expensive to 
implement for greenhouse gases.  Like Waxman-Markey and Kerry-
Lieberman, the greenhouse gas emissions data collected under any CAA 
program would be important in confirming compliance with regulatory 
requirements.  These data would also likely complement and expand upon 
data collected in EPA’s existing greenhouse gas inventory. 
Perhaps the biggest concern regarding monitoring, reporting, and 
verification is the failure of Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax bills to 
authorize the creation of a national greenhouse gas inventory.  EPA’s 
Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Rule fills this gap currently, 
but EPA’s authority to assemble this inventory has been called into 
question.  EPA has based its authority to require greenhouse gas reporting 
on CAA Section 114 for stationary sources and CAA Section 208 for 
mobile sources.198 These provisions generally allow EPA to require such 
reporting, recordkeeping, and monitoring as is “reasonably required” to 
 196. Id.; see also Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam For Tax, 61 
TAX LAW. 357, 377 (Winter 2008) [hereinafter Whistleblowers]. This threat has somewhat 
abated over the last several years.  Id.  In fact, between FY 2005 and FY 2009, the number of 
corporate tax returns that the IRS audited declined dramatically: in FY 2005, 43% of 
corporations with assets of $250 million or more were audited; by 2009, this number had 
dropped to 25%.  See TRAC IRS, Despite Rising Deficits, IRS Audits of the Largest and 
Richest Corp orat ions  Decline, available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/new findings/v15 
(last visited Jun. 24, 2010). In that time, the IRS also cut back on the number of hours it 
spent auditing these corporations by one third.  Id. 
 197. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 4083 (authority for Treasury to inspect gasoline tax records). 
 198. 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 56,286–87 (Oct. 30, 2009). 
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help the agency develop standards under the CAA, implement the CAA, 
as well as to determine compliance with the CAA.199 Although EPA 
almost certainly has authority to compile the inventory at present, if 
regulation of greenhouse gases proceeds under other legislation, EPA 
may lose this authority, as it arguably will no longer be collecting such 
information to develop CAA standards or monitor compliance.  At the 
same time, some Members of Congress have introduced bills that would 
strip EPA of its authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the CAA or 
otherwise delay EPA’s work on greenhouse gases, which could also 
disrupt assembly and maintenance of the inventory.200 Given the 
importance of clear, comprehensive information on greenhouse gas 
emissions, it may be advisable to codify EPA’s authority to continue this 
vital work. 
Although monitoring, reporting, and verification requirements are 
essential to an effective enforcement system, not all of the greenhouse 
gas control options adequately address these requirements.  Indeed, 
while Waxman-Markey, Kerry-Lieberman and the traditional CAA 
programs all set out extensive requirements for monitoring, reporting and 
verifying emissions, Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax proposals fail 
to set forth any such requirements.  Even more problematic is the failure 
of Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax proposals to establish a national 
greenhouse gas inventory, which—in light of the various challenges to 
EPA’s authority to compile such an inventory—may lead to insufficient 
information about greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. 
D.  Transparency 
The manner in which the various greenhouse gas control options 
approach transparency varies not only among the programs, but also 
within the programs themselves. For example, while Waxman-Markey 
and Kerry-Lieberman include provisions that ensure that greenhouse gas 
emissions data are available to the public, they fail to treat the data related to 
offsets in the same manner.  Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax 
proposals fail to set out sufficient guidelines for disseminating data.  
And, while the CAA includes provisions to make emissions data 
available to the public, much of the data sits in state files that are not 
readily accessible.  These programs may not, therefore, be sufficiently 
transparent. 
In many respects, transparency of greenhouse gas emissions data is the 
cornerstone of any greenhouse gas control program.  Making emissions 
 199. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7414(a)(1), 7542(a) (2006). 
 200. See generally S.J.Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 3072, 111th Cong. (2010). 
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data publicly available allows the public to access and analyze the 
data.201 In doing so, a regulatory agency “enlists the public in the 
oversight of the program and enhances the public’s acceptance of the 
program.”202 Experience with other tradable permit programs has shown 
that transparency of emissions data enhances enforcement: “[q]uality 
assurance is easier if data are widely available; veracity-checking is 
facilitated by the availability of multiple sources of information; and the 
involvement of private monitors is frequently heavily dependent upon 
the existence of a rich database.”203 Indeed, the public availability of 
data in the Acid Rain Program, including data on emissions, compliance 
and allowances, has “help[ed] to create a transparent and self-enforcing 
compliance system. . .”204 This has contributed to the “high compliance 
records” in the program.205 For these reasons, transparency is likely to 
play an important role in the success of any greenhouse gas control 
program. 
Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman take a similar approach to the 
dissemination of emissions data.  Under these bills, EPA is required to 
publicly disseminate data submitted by regulated entities “as soon as 
practicable” after EPA audits such data.206 There are some data, such as 
confidential business information (“CBI”), that are exempt from 
dissemination.  Although Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman make 
clear that data related to greenhouse gas emissions will not be considered 
CBI,207 data available under these programs may not be as transparent as 
under the Acid Rain Program.  The EPA’s final rule for Mandatory 
Reporting of Greenhouse Gases suggests that only those entities that are 
already required to collect and report data using CEMS under a separate 
program will be required to directly measure their emissions.  Other 
entities will be given a choice of using CEMS or facility-specific 
calculations.  Although it is likely that most of the data used for these 
 201. Fundamentals, supra note 8, at 1582. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Tom Tietenberg, The Tradable-Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons: 
Lessons For Climate Change, 19 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 400, 415 (2003) [hereinafter 
Tradable-Permits Approach]. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 416. 
 206. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 713(b)(1)(N); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 
32, § 713(b)(1)(N). 
 207. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 713(b)(1)(N); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 
32, § 713(b)(1)(N). 
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calculations will be made available to the public, some of these data may 
be claimed as CBI by reporting entities. 
EPA’s recently proposed CBI regulations for the Mandatory Reporting of 
Greenhouse Gases Rule provide some insight in what information will 
likely be available to the public.  Although EPA generally determines 
what constitutes CBI on a case-by-case basis, it has indicated that, due to 
the number of reporting entities and the amount of data to be submitted 
by those entities, this practice would likely lead to significant delays in 
making greenhouse gas emissions data available to the public.208 Under 
the proposed regulations, “emissions data,” which are actual or estimated 
emissions, inputs to emissions equations, and calculation methodologies, 
would be publicly available, along with certain test and calibration 
methods.209  Although it is unclear whether the final rule will retain this 
level of transparency, legislators may want to follow EPA’s lead by 
adopting similar language into pending bills. 
In contrast to emissions data, Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman 
limit the dissemination of data related to offset projects.  For all offset 
projects, Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman require an offset 
project developer to submit verification reports, prepared by accredited 
third-party verifiers, which set forth information necessary to determine 
the quantity of greenhouse gas reductions.  This information includes the 
quantity of greenhouse gases reduced, avoided, or sequestered and the 
methodologies used for the project.210  Waxman-Markey generally makes 
these reports available to the public within 90 days after they are 
received, but does not require verification reports for agriculture and 
forestry offset projects to be made publicly available.211 Kerry-Lieberman 
 208. 75 Fed. Reg. 39,094, 39,101–02 (July 7, 2010); see also Gabriel Nelson, Emissions: 
EPA expansion of GHG reporting program finished for now, GREENWIRE, June 30, 2010, 
at para. 12. 
 209. 75 Fed. Reg. at 39,097. 
 210. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 736(a), (b); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32,    
§ 736(a), (b). 
 211. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 737(a)(1). Reticence to make public information 
about environmental regulation of agriculture is not new. At the state level, there has 
been some legal wrangling over the public availability of information relating to farms 
and agriculture. For example, Maryland’s Water Quality Improvement Act (the “WQIA”) 
was enacted in 1998 in order to “address [] the health and environmental concerns caused by 
agricultural runoff.”  M D. CODE ANN., AGRIC. §§ 8-801–807; see also Paul L. Sorisio, Poultry, 
Waste, and Pollution: The Lack  of Enforcement of Maryland’s  Water Quality 
Improvement Act, 62 M D. L. REV. 1054, 1056 (2003). The “backbone” of the WQIA is 
the requirement that all farms implement a nutrient management plan (“NMP”), which 
sets forth a plan to manage animal waste, fertilizer, sludge and other plant nutrients on a farm. 
See M D. CODE ANN., AGRIC. § 8-801(c). Although farms are required to file summaries 
of their NMPs with the Maryland Department of Agriculture (the “MDA”), these 
summaries are to be maintained for three years “in a manner that protects the identity of 
the individual for whom the [NMP] was prepared.” MD. CODE ANN., AGRIC. § 8.801.1(b). 
128 
 
SCHANG-CHA N VISUAL (DO NOT DELETE)  3/11/2016  1:31 PM 
[VOL. 2:  87, 2010]  Greenhouse Gas Control Options 
 SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
further limits the availability of verification reports: while it requires 
verification reports related to international offset projects be made public 
within ninety days of receipt, it does not require any verification reports 
related to domestic offset projects be made publicly available.212 Both 
Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman therefore limit the transparency 
of the offsets programs, making it difficult for the public to be involved 
in oversight of the programs.   
There appears to be little reason to keep offset verification reports 
confidential. To the contrary, offsets are a publicly-created good: those 
that obtain an offset are being paid from a government-created market to 
voluntarily undertake actions to improve the environment.  This is not an 
instance of intrusive government regulation or excessive disclosure, but of 
voluntary actions on which the public is relying to reduce an imminent 
and substantial threat to human health and the environment. Requiring 
public disclosure of the underlying data is an important aspect of this.  
And, case-specific or category-specific CBI claims for certain kinds of 
data could still be made, instead of declaring all domestic offsets off 
limits as Kerry-Lieberman does. 
It nonetheless seems that Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman 
trade, to varying degrees, the public availability of offset reports for 
third-party verification.  While third-party verification can help ensure 
the reliability of the offsets and their additionality, it is no replacement 
for transparency.  Many questions have already been raised about the 
reliability and additionality of offsets created under the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”).  Allowing U.S. offsets to be 
verified by third parties, but not vetted by the public, does not help to 
dispel market distrust of these instruments.  Reliance on third-party 
verifiers may also be highly questionable given recent experience with 
Representatives of the farming industry have asserted that these provisions are essential 
to p rot ecting a farm’s  comp et it iveness . Indeed, after a coalition of environmental 
groups sought disclosure of certain NMP summaries in an action filed against the MDA 
in 2008, one farming industry representative called NMPs “critical business planning 
documents,” the release of which would “impact [a farm’s] competitiveness.” Maryland Farm 
Bureau, Maryland Farm Bureau Seeks Court Protection for Family Farmers, 6 SPOTLIGHT 1, 1 
(Aug. 2008), quot ing t he President of the Maryland Farm Bureau. Another industry 
representative further asserted that the release of NMP information would lead to third-
party enforcement suits that would only “prove [farms] are doing what the state already 
enforces.” Id. at 8. T hese same industry interests may have motivat ed the drafters of 
Waxman-Markey to omit any requirement that agriculture offset projects make their verification 
reports publicly available. 
 212. Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, § 758(b). 
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the CDM.  A review conducted for World Wildlife Fund found that third 
party verification reports were initially accepted only 36% of the time, 
with 57% of the verification reports requiring corrections.213 Further, it 
gave the highest-ranking verifier a grade of D on a scale of A to F, with 
most verifiers earning Es or Fs.214 One cannot help but draw an analogy 
with credit rating agencies, whose verification of the credit worthiness of 
many financial instruments later turned out to be unreliable.  Reliance on 
third-party verification without significant oversight and auditing poses a 
significant threat to confidence in the overall market and, therefore, to 
the ability of the programs to meet their environmental objectives.215 
For the other greenhouse gas control programs, it is not yet clear how 
transparent these programs will be. To start, none of the provisions in 
Cantwell-Collins address the public dissemination of emissions or 
offsets data.  As with other aspects of the program, this has presumably 
been left to the Secretary to determine through the promulgation of 
regulations. Given the large degree of discretion afforded the Secretary, 
it is not clear Treasury would require the same degree of transparency 
traditionally provided by environmental regulators. This can result in 
significantly less information being available to the public. 
A carbon tax would present perhaps the most significant hurdle for 
transparency of emissions and offsets data.  Under the Code, the IRS is 
prohibited from disclosing any information included in a tax return, 
except in certain limited circumstances.216  Thus, unless the legislation 
were written to require disclosure, which the existing bills do not 
require, the taxes paid and the underlying carbon use data would not be 
publicly available.217 This lack of transparency may impact not only    
the public understanding of greenhouse gas controls, but also the 
effectiveness of the tax itself.  If regulated entities subject to the tax are 
unable to verify their competitors’ compliance with the tax, or believe 
that there is widespread non-compliance, then they will be less likely to 
comply themselves.218 
 213. Lambert Schneider & Lennart Mohr, Oko-Institute, V., 2010 Rating of Designated 
Operational Entities Accredited under the Clean Development Mechanism (June 28, 2010), 
http://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/1023/2010-079-en.pdf. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Fundamentals, supra note 8, at 1582 (“Publicly available, high-quality data are 
essential for allowance market pricing to work efficiently and for achieving emission 
reductions at the lowest possible cost.”). 
 216. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2010); see also Whistleblowers, supra note 196, at 372.  
For example, the IRS may identify those who are subject to certain excise taxes, and tax 
information may be disclosed in certain judicial and administrative proceedings. 
 217. SEC reporting might decrease some opacity, but it is unlikely citizens could 
obtain a clear view of company-level contributions to the carbon tax. 
 218. Understanding Deterrence, supra note 181, at 14–17. 
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EPA’s traditional CAA programs afford greater transparency of data.  
Almost all facility-specific records are available for inspection from 
EPA and state offices. While at first blush this sounds quite transparent, 
there are many hurdles that need to be crossed to actually receive these 
records.  These include the inability to access records other than through 
in-person review; costs charged by agencies for reproduction; time delays 
in gaining access to records; and CBI claims.  In comparison to the cap-
and-trade data that may be made available on the internet, the traditional 
CAA authorities may provide less transparency in regards to emissions 
data.  Further, to the extent that greenhouse gas controls are put in place 
using CAA authority, most information would likely be gathered at the 
state level. In addition to posing high hurdles for data access, this could 
make it difficult to gain a national-level picture of greenhouse gas 
emissions controls, unless EPA were to insist on national reporting. 
One final, important aspect of transparency is transparency in the 
emissions market. In order for there to be effective oversight of such a 
market, a regulatory agency needs sufficient data about the market, 
including prices, trades, and trends.219 In fact, “[t]he more detailed 
information an oversight body receives, the better its capacity to detect 
trading irregularities and inconsistencies,” thereby allowing it to identify 
“suspicious spikes in the market price or trade volume.”220 Each of the 
proposed cap-and-trade programs provides for public dissemination of 
information related to the emissions market. For instance, Waxman-
Markey requires EPA to implement a system to track emission allowances 
and offset credits and to make this information available to the public.221 
Similarly, Kerry-Lieberman requires EPA to implement an allowance 
tracking system that is to be made publicly available.222  Kerry-Lieberman 
also requires any trading organization to provide the public with trading 
information in real time. This includes bids, settlement prices, and 
opening and closing ranges for all greenhouse gas instruments traded 
through the organization.223 And, while Cantwell-Collins has a limited 
emissions market, the bill still requires that, for any trades that occur, all 
relevant transaction dates, allowance quantities, and prices be “made 
 219. See Financial Markets, supra note 21, at 10,062. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 724(d). 
 222. Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, § 724(c). 
 223. Id. § 2410. 
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publicly available on a real-time basis.”224 This degree of transparency 
should assist in the effective supervision of a greenhouse gas market. 
As is clear from the foregoing, the various greenhouse gas options  
approach transparency differently. While Waxman-Markey and Kerry-
Lieberman generally allow emissions data to be made available to the 
public, they fail to make all information related to their offsets programs 
available. Traditional CAA authority affords a certain degree of 
transparency, but there are significant hurdles to cross to gain access to 
information.  Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax proposals fail to even 
address the public availability of data.  This will likely affect public trust 
in the program and the ability of the public to fully participate in 
overseeing them. 
E.  Role of Citizens 
Despite the central role of citizen enforcement in environmental law, it 
remains unclear whether citizens will be afforded the same role in 
implementing and enforcing greenhouse gas control options. Part of this 
stems from the fact that citizen suits may not be necessary for overseeing 
emissions markets in the cap-and-trade programs since penalties are 
automatically enforced against violators. Nevertheless, several of the 
options fail to provide for citizen enforcement or fail to provide data to 
allow citizen enforcement—or both—even where it would be useful to 
do so. 
Citizens play an important role in enforcing environmental laws. 
Although federal and state agencies hold the primary responsibility for 
enforcement, every major environmental law includes “citizen suit” 
provisions. Citizen suits allow “private citizens to enforce the laws when 
the government [is] unwilling or unable to do so.”225 For instance, citizen 
suits are needed to “make up the balance of necessary enforcement at 
times when under-funded or over-worked agencies [cannot] ensure that 
all laws are complied with.”226 Indeed, “[c]itizen resources are an 
important adjunct to governmental action to assure that these laws are 
adequately enforced. In a time of limited [g]overnment resources, 
enforcement through court action prompted by citizen suits is a valuable 
 224. Cantwell-Collins, supra note 33, § 4(b)(7)(A)(ii). 
 225. Will Reisinger et al., Environmental Enforcement and the Limits of Cooperative 
Federalism: Will Courts Allow Citizen Suits to Pick Up the Slack?, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y FORUM 1, 2 (Winter 2010) [hereinafter Limits]. 
 226. Id. 
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dimension of environmental law.”227 At the same time, citizen suits are 
also needed to hold government agencies accountable where, due to 
political considerations or otherwise, those agencies fail to bring enforcement 
proceedings.228 This is particularly important in the context of greenhouse 
gas programs, which will need to be implemented over a period of 40 
years or more in states whose governors and legislators may not support 
greenhouse gas regulation. 
The various greenhouse gas control options take different approaches 
to the role of citizens.  To start, Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax 
proposals do not contain any citizen suit provisions and otherwise fail to 
carve out a role for citizens. Citizen enforcement is therefore unlikely to 
be available under these two approaches, not only because of a lack of 
statutory authority, but also—in the case of carbon taxes—a lack of data. 
This leaves these programs solely in the hands of federal regulators 
without a ready lever to use in the face of changing political and economic 
environments over time, which may leave the programs’ effectiveness at 
risk. 
In contrast, Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman allow citizen suits 
through existing CAA provisions.229 While this suggests some role for 
citizens, these suits may have diminished utility for cap-and-trade 
programs, and may not even be able to be brought.230 In regards to 
utility, this will likely depend on the nature of the violation: citizen suits 
are likely to be useful for various violations of offset, monitoring, and 
reporting provisions. They are, however, likely to be less useful for 
violations of allowable emission limits (i.e., where regulated entities 
hold too few allowances).231 This is because, like the Acid Rain 
Program, both bills require penalties for such violations to be assessed 
automatically. This means that they are due immediately and without 
 227. James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 
30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2003) (quoting 136 Cong. Rec. S3, 183 (daily ed. Mar. 
26, 1990) (remarks of Sen. David Durenberger)). 
 228. Id. at 6. 
 229. Waxman-Markey,  supra note 31, § 337(d); Kerry-Lieberman,  supra note 
32, § 2503(c). 
 230. See, e.g., Limits, supra note 225, at 28–57 (citing costs and attorneys’ fees, standing, 
Eleventh Amendment arguments, and the definition of diligent prosecution as barriers to 
successful citizen suits). 
 231. All greenhouse gas provisions under Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman 
are “emission standards or limitations” subject to citizen suit provisions.  Waxman-Markey, 
supra note 31, § 723(b)(3); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, § 2503(c). 
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action by the enforcing agency,232 leaving little room, or apparent need, 
for citizen involvement. At the same time, a citizen suit might not even 
be possible for such violations.  The CAA only allows such a suit “if 
there is evidence that the alleged violation has been repeated.”233 Query 
whether a violation would have to occur twice before a citizen could 
successfully maintain a suit.234  Moreover, to the extent USDA 
would have oversight and non-discretionary duties under an offsets 
program, an action may not be able to be brought against USDA as both 
bills seem to preclude such an action.235 
Like Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman, regulation under traditional 
CAA authorities would allow citizen suits through existing CAA 
provisions.  In contrast to the two bills, citizen enforcement would likely 
have some utility, particularly under the PSD program.  In fact, because 
programs under the CAA do not allow for immediate and automatic 
penalties, citizen oversight could be quite useful.  Citizen suits could 
therefore play their traditional role of helping to encourage robust 
program implementation by state and federal regulators. 
It remains to be seen, however, whether significant procedural hurdles 
to citizen suits will prevent them from being brought under any 
greenhouse gas control option. The court-created doctrine of standing 
requires plaintiffs to demonstrate an actual or imminent injury in fact 
that is concrete and particularized, that is fairly traceable to the acts of 
the defendant, and that can likely be redressed by a favorable court 
decision.236 Although the Supreme Court found standing for Massachusetts 
to bring a case against EPA to regulate greenhouse gases, it did so based 
on the “special solicitude” that states enjoy in a standing analysis.237 
Whether a court would find similar standing for private litigants acting 
to enforce violations of a greenhouse gas program is unclear and will 
 232. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 723(b)(3); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, 
§ 723(b)(3). 
 233. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (2010). See Arnold Reitze, AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: 
COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT 521, 601 (2001) (CAA amendments partially overruled 
Gwaltney decision that limited suits for purely past violations). 
 234. Even if a citizen suit could survive these barriers, there are also some procedural 
hurdles that must be cleared.  Before filing a suit a citizen must give EPA, the state, and 
the defendant at least sixty days notice. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (2010). And, a citizen may 
not bring suit if EPA or the state has  already  brought  and is diligently pursuing an 
enforcement action in court.  Id. This prohibition does not, however, apply to administrative 
penalties, and does not foreclose the citizen from intervening in the enforcement action 
as a matter of right. Id. 
 235. While the bills’ conforming amendments included other agencies, such as USDA, 
in t he definition of “Administrator,” this was  not done for CAA Section 304.  See 
Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 337; Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, § 2503. 
 236. See, e.g., Limits, supra note 225, at 35. 
 237. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 514 (2007). 
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depend to some degree on the future direction of the standing doctrine as 
shaped by the courts.238 
Accordingly, it is likely that citizens will face significant barriers to 
participate in the oversight of the various greenhouse gas control 
options. Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax proposals fail to even carve 
out a role for citizens, making it unlikely that citizens will be able to 
participate in oversight of those programs. While the citizen suit 
provisions of the CAA apply under Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman, 
it is not yet clear whether citizen suits would serve any purpose, or even 
be possible, under either bill given substantive and procedural limitations. It 
is particularly worrisome that citizen suits related to oversight of the 
USDA-administered agriculture and forestry offsets program seem to be 
precluded under the two bills despite the need for enhanced citizen 
oversight. At the same time, some of the same procedural limitations 
that may create a barrier to citizen participation under Waxman-Markey 
and Kerry-Lieberman may also create a barrier under traditional CAA 
programs. 
F.  Role of the States 
In establishing a role for states, federal greenhouse gas control 
programs must engage in a careful balancing act: they must balance the 
need to utilize state expertise and capacity to implement traditional 
environmental programs against the need for nationwide consistency.  
Nationwide consistency may be particularly undermined where a state 
does not support greenhouse gas controls. A review of the various 
greenhouse gas control options shows that the cap-and-trade programs 
and carbon tax proposals properly reflect this balancing act by providing 
 238. See Limits, supra note 225, at 34–42. The discussion draft of Waxman-Markey 
did include a citizen suit provision.  This provision allowed citizens to bring an action if 
they suffered, or reasonably expected to suffer, harm attributable to a violation of an emissions 
standard or limit ation, or EPA’s failure to perform non-discretionary duty. Waxman-
Markey Discussion Draft, § 336(a), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/ 
20090331/acesa_discussiondraft.pdf. The term “harm” was defined to include “any effect of 
air pollution (including climate change), currently occurring or at risk of occurring, and 
the incremental exacerbation of any such effect or risk that is associated with a small 
incremental emission of any air pollutant . . . whether or not the effect or risk is widely 
shared.” Id. This provision was deleted before the House passed the bill, and the language 
about harm was put into the bill’s findings instead. It remains to be seen whether courts 
will give any weight to such findings or whether further judicial development of the standing 
doctrine will preclude citizen suits for climate change harms. 
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states with a distinct, but diminished, role.  Maintaining the states’ 
traditional roles under the CAA authorities may, however, prove 
problematic. 
In most environmental statutes, states are given the primary responsibility 
for implementing and enforcing federal laws and regulations using the 
“cooperative federalism” approach.239 Under this approach, the federal 
government sets minimum environmental standards and the states have 
the “primary responsibility” for implementing programs to meet those 
standards.240 Each state is generally required “to decide which sources to 
regulate and the extent to which each will be regulated” so that the 
national standards are met.241 States also have the right to impose stricter 
standards.242 At the same time, the federal government continues to play 
a role in overseeing the state programs. The federal government is 
responsible for not only providing initial approval of the programs, but 
also monitoring the programs for compliance.243 This system is intended 
to allow states to tailor their programs to local conditions while ensuring 
sufficient uniformity among states so that minimum federal standards 
are met. 
State involvement in a cap-and-trade program does, however, pose  
some risks to the consistency of the national market. For example, while 
implementing the Acid Rain Program, New York attempted to prohibit 
the sale of excess acid rain allowances from New York sources in order 
to create a more stringent program.244 And when EPA created Clean Air 
Mercury Rule (“CAMR”), less than half the states signed up to engage 
in the trading program, leaving EPA to implement the program in the 
other half of the states.  At the international level, the European Union’s 
Emission Trading System has been troubled by reports of certain 
member states overestimating emissions and Hungary selling “used” 
credits back into the open market.245 At the same time, studies have shown 
that, in the United States, state penalties assessed against polluters 
tend to be significantly lower than penalties assessed by the federal 
 239. See Limits, supra note 225, at 6. 
 240. STAFF OF COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, Climate Change Legislation 
Design White Paper: Appropriate Roles for Different Levels of Government 8 (2008), 
ht t p ://energycommerce.house.gov/images/stories/Document s /PDF/selected_legislation/
white%20paper%20st-lcl%20roles %20final%202-22.pdf  [hereinafter Appropriate Roles for 
Different Levels of Government]. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 8–9. 
 243. Limits, supra note 225, at 6. 
 244. The federal courts rejected this effort on the grounds that it was pre-empted by 
the CAA.  See generally Clean Air Markets Group v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 245. See generally ClimateWire.com, Hungary Says Trader Bought Used Credits, Shakes 
Carbon Market, Mar. 22, 2010. 
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government.246 In light of the potential bias of state officials toward in-
state economic interests and the open opposition of some officials to 
greenhouse gas regulation, giving significant authority of the trading 
mechanisms of any greenhouse gas system to states could result in an 
unsteady market, delay in implementation and uneven environmental 
results. 
Because of the paramount need for national consistency and oversight, 
virtually any cap-and-trade program will diminish the role of the states 
to some degree.  For example, the Acid Rain Program is “one of the 
most federally-oriented air pollution control programs” with a highly 
centralized enforcement system.247 Experience with this program “has 
shown that, for cap-and-trade programs, centralized program implementation, 
including data reporting and verification, is efficient and works well.”248 
Even in this highly centralized program, however, it is important to 
recognize that states still play an important role in enforcement. States 
have the authority, for example, to enforce monitoring requirements.249 
And, about 40% of the staff for the Acid Rain Program is state and local 
agency employees who conduct field audits.250 
Both Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman set out a role for states 
in enforcing their greenhouse gas control programs that is reminiscent of 
the Acid Rain Program. Under both bills, states are prohibited from 
implementing or enforcing a cap-and-trade program.251 Certain state 
actions do not, however, fall within the scope of this prohibition. States 
can still, for example, adopt standards, limits, regulations or programs to 
reduce greenhouse gases so long as they are not implemented through 
the issuance of a limited number of tradable instruments.252 In addition, 
under both bills, states may be delegated the responsibility for conducting 
audits of domestic offset projects.253 
 246. See, e.g., Mark Atlas, Enforcement Principles and Enforcement Agencies: Principal- 
Agent Relationships in a Delegated Environmental Program, 41 LAW & SOC. REV. 939, 
971 (2007). 
 247. Appropriate Roles for Different Levels of Government, supra note 240, at 2. 
 248. Fundamentals, supra note 8, at 1581. 
 249. Appropriate Roles for Different Levels of Government, supra note 240, at 9. 
 250. Beyond Playing Banker, supra note 14, at 286. 
 251. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 335; Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, § 2501. 
Waxman-Markey only preempts state cap-and-trade programs from 2012 to 2017. 
 252. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 335; Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, § 2501. 
 253. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 738(b) (2009); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 
32, § 739(d)(1) (2009). 
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For the other greenhouse gas control programs, it is not yet clear what 
role states will play. Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax proposals do 
not set out any provisions related to the role of states, and do not 
preempt existing state greenhouse gas programs. This could have various 
outcomes. It could leave states unfettered authority to run their own 
greenhouse gas trading systems, set their own renewable portfolio 
standards, and otherwise continue to regulate greenhouse gases on a 
state and regional basis. But Congress may preempt such state activities 
or states may deem them duplicative if Cantwell-Collins or a carbon 
tax is implemented. Alternatively, some combination of these scenarios 
could play out. What seems clear, however, is that there appears little 
room for state involvement in a carbon market, and states would have 
little to no role in implementing and enforcing a federal carbon tax. 
Implementation and enforcement of greenhouse gas controls through 
traditional CAA authorities would rely heavily on the states because the 
NSPS and PSD programs are implemented at the state level. This is 
potentially problematic, as opposition to regulation of greenhouse gases 
under the CAA is pronounced in some states.254 This may require EPA 
to federally implement these programs in many states during a time of 
serious federal budget shortfalls and significant opposition to expansion of 
the role of the federal government.255 At the same time, if EPA were to 
devise a cap-and-trade program under CAA Section 111, it would be 
important to maintain centralized EPA control over the market 
mechanisms, as was done in the Acid Rain Program and the CAMR. 
From the foregoing review, it appears that most of the greenhouse gas 
control options appropriately balance the role of states, involving states 
in the implementation of the cap-and-trade programs while leaving the 
national market and national tax provisions largely to federal agencies to 
implement. The notable exception is the peril of heavy reliance on states 
if greenhouse gas controls are implemented using traditional CAA 
authority. 
G.  Penalties 
The various greenhouse gas control options all establish fairly stringent 
penalties for non-compliance. These penalties range from 100% to 500% 
 254. See, e.g., Letter from Bryan Shaw, Chairman, Texas Commission on Environmental 
Quality, and Gregg Abbot, Attorney General of Texas to Lisa Jackson, Administrator, EPA, 
and Alfred Armendariz, Region VI Administrator, EPA (Aug. 2, 2010) (heavily criticizing 
EPA regulation of greenhouse gases under the CAA). 
 255. J. Cohen & D. Balz, What’s So Good About the Government, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 
2010 at A1 (public evenly split between wanting more services and higher taxes versus 
fewer services and lower taxes). 
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and, while these penalties are lower than those under the Acid Rain 
Program, they appear sufficient to deter non-compliance. It remains 
unclear, however, whether any of the proposed programs would provide 
sufficient compliance assistance to help regulated entities understand 
and comply with the programs’ provisions, thereby avoiding the need for 
penalties in the first place. 
The penalty provisions of any greenhouse gas reduction program 
should ensure that potential violators face sanctions that deter illegal 
behavior and encourage compliance with the program. This usually 
involves civil or criminal sanctions that (1) are sufficiently stringent so 
that compliance is more economically beneficial than non-compliance;256 
(2) are swiftly and publicly assessed;257 and (3) are accompanied by 
sufficient compliance assistance so that regulated sources can understand 
and comply with requirements in an efficient and timely manner.258 
Experience with the Acid Rain Program suggests that, for cap-and-
trade programs, penalties that are significantly more expensive than the 
cost of compliance and that are assessed quickly—even automatically—
are likely to be successful. Under the program, if a regulated entity fails 
to have sufficient emissions credits to meet its compliance obligations, 
penalties of $2,000 per ton of emissions (equal to almost seven times the 
average market price of an emissions credit) are automatically due, and 
the deficient number of credits from the entity’s compliance budget are 
deducted from the following year.259 
The proposed cap-and-trade programs all follow the Acid Rain Program’s 
example of assessing high and swift penalties for non-compliance. Both 
Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman assess automatic penalties of 
twice the going market rate for emissions allowances.  In addition, these 
bills require violators to forfeit allowances from their current or future 
budgets in order to cover the excess emissions.260 Cantwell-Collins 
provides even stricter penalties, requiring violators to pay five times the 
 256. David Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: 
Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the Unites States, 
the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1690 (1995) (“each action must 
reliably result in civil penalties that (1) dep rive t he violat or of all economic benefits 
derived from the violations, and (2) place the violator in a significantly worse position 
than it would have been if it had complied.”). 
 257. Reinventing, supra note 183, at 60–61. 
 258. Id. at 67–70. 
 259. See, e.g., Fundamentals, supra note 8, at 1578. 
 260. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 723; Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, § 723. 
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market rate for emissions allowances.261 The penalty is immediately due 
and payable to the Secretary.262 
The proposed carbon tax bills do not contain separate penalty provisions 
and rely on the Code’s existing penalty provisions. The Code includes a 
“variety of civil penalties,”263 with “over 600 distinct civil tax penalty 
provisions.”264 For example, the IRS has the right, which would presumably 
apply to carbon tax penalties, to assess a 100% penalty on taxpayers that 
have willfully failed to collect, truthfully account for, or pay taxes that 
are due to the federal government.265 In addition, the Code includes 
criminal sanctions.266 The civil tax code penalties are significantly less 
than those provided in the cap-and-trade bills. And, unlike the Acid Rain 
Program, they are not automatically assessed and due, but require detection 
and assessment by Treasury. This could delay enforcement and give 
violators the chance to escape detection. 
EPA’s traditional CAA authorities provide for significant daily 
penalties for non-compliance, plus assessment of penalties to recoup any 
economic benefits enjoyed by the violator due to non-compliance.267 
Penalties are not automatically due, however, and calculation of the 
economic benefit requires application of a complex economic model. 
Like a carbon tax, EPA or states must detect the violation and decide to 
enforce, neither of which may occur. Further, penalties are usually assessed 
through settlements that result in payment of less than the maximum 
fine.268 Assessment of penalties also requires significant resources to 
bring administrative or judicial actions. 
At the same time, although compliance with CAA requirements has 
not been well studied, there is reason to be concerned about relying on 
traditional CAA programs. While compliance with the Acid Rain 
Program appears to be over 99%,269 compliance with the more routine 
permitting and emission requirements of the NSPS, PSD, NESHAPs and 
other programs appears to be far less robust. A Council on Environmental 
 261. Cantwell-Collins, supra note 33, § 4(a)(5) (2009). We do not have sufficient data 
to comment  on whether t here would be a mat erial difference bet ween a penalty 
for 200%, 500%, and 1000% in deterring non-compliance. 
 262. Id. § 4(a)(5)(C). 
 263. Id. 
 264. Craig A. Max IV, Hand-Holding, Brow-Beating, and Shaming into Compliance: A 
Comparative Survey of Enforcement Mechanisms  for  Tax Compliance, 40 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 541, 565, 573 (Mar. 2007) [hereinafter Hand Holding]. 
 265. Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (2010); see also United States v. 
Novelli, 381 F. Supp. 2d. 1125, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting United States v. Jones, 33 
F.3d 1137, 1139 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 266. Interplay, supra note 194, at 1456. 
 267. Stationary Source, supra note 121, at 272–80. 
 268. Hodas, supra note 256, at 1609. 
 269. Fundamentals, supra note 8, at 1576. 
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Quality study in the 1990s estimated that industrial source compliance 
with CAA requirements was as low as 35% resulting in emissions being 
about 10% above regulatory levels.270 Therefore, the traditional CAA 
penalty authorities are much less nimble, much less certain to be 
assessed and likely less effective than using a well designed cap-and-
trade model. 
Although penalties are important, they are not sufficient to assure 
compliance. Compliance assistance—creating programs that are easily 
implemented; working with regulated entities to understand their industries 
and concerns; answering questions and providing guidance—is a crucial 
element of enforcement. Indeed, EPA staff have credited the success of 
the Acid Rain Program to extensive collaboration with regulated entities, 
including provision of compliance assistance—and not to draconian 
penalties.271   From the pending greenhouse gas control options, it is not 
clear whether sufficient resources would be allocated to the implementing 
agencies to ensure robust compliance assurance efforts. 
Accordingly, the various greenhouse gas control options all appear to 
impose sufficiently stringent penalties to deter non-compliance.  Indeed, 
all of the cap-and-trade programs assess penalties that are well above the 
market rate for emission allowances.  And, while the carbon tax proposals 
and traditional CAA authority assess smaller penalties, these penalties 
are still significant.  It is important to note nonetheless that, unlike the 
cap-and-trade programs, penalties under the carbon tax proposals and 
traditional CAA authority are not assessed automatically and, as such, 
may take some time and resources to detect.  At the same time, while the 
various greenhouse gas control programs all appear to have sufficient 
penalty provisions, it is not yet clear whether any of these programs will 
have sufficient compliance assistance to help regulated entities meet 
their compliance obligations. 
  
 270. See Clifford Russell, “Monitoring and Enforcement,” in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Paul Portney ed., 1990). 
 271. Fundamentals, supra note 8, at 1579–80. 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
Given the controversial nature of greenhouse gas controls, the long 
timeline it will take to implement greenhouse gas control programs, and 
the potentially very broad reach of these programs across the economy, 
it will be critical that the chosen control method can be enforced with 
relative consistency, fairness, ease, and immediacy over the life of the 
program and throughout the country. Our review of the various greenhouse 
gas control options shows that there are relative strengths and weaknesses, 
as well as important tradeoffs to be made in the enforcement provisions 
of each of the leading candidate programs. In particular: 
• Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman lower implementation 
costs to the regulated community, but bring tremendous 
regulatory complexity. While these programs generally contain 
strong and important monitoring, reporting and verification 
requirements, they fail to provide for strong and transparent 
reporting and verification provisions in regards to offsets, 
particularly forestry and agricultural offsets. While the bills 
allow for citizen suits, the utility and availability of these suits 
are limited in a cap-and-trade program, and the bills inexplicably 
exempt agricultural and forestry offsets from them. The bills 
necessarily rely on states to assist in implementing the 
programs, but rightfully place oversight of emissions markets 
with federal authorities. These programs will take a significant 
amount of time to implement and promise significant political 
conflict and an ongoing stream of litigation. 
• Cantwell-Collins proposes a far simpler scheme than the 
leading cap-and-trade proposals, but it would likely also bring 
higher implementation costs to the regulated community. It 
fails to create a central inventory of greenhouse gas emissions 
and forecloses citizen enforcement of its provisions, leaving it 
sorely lacking in transparency. At the same time, the program 
places implementation in the hands of Treasury, which has 
little expertise in administering such programs. 
• Carbon tax proposals promise even greater ease of  
implementation, but will not bring the synergies and lower 
costs that cap-and-trade models promise. The bills also fail to 
explain significant program details, and the enforcement efforts 
may be lacking if they follow existing federal tax procedures. 
Like Cantwell-Collins, the carbon tax bills fail to create a 
national inventory of greenhouse gas emissions, lack 
transparency, and do not allow a role for citizen enforcement. 
142 
SCHANG-CHA N VISUAL (DO NOT DELETE)  3/11/2016  1:31 PM 
[VOL. 2:  87, 2010]  Greenhouse Gas Control Options 
 SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
• Reliance on traditional EPA authority under the CAA faces 
significant barriers to optimizing program implementation. 
Although the enforcement provisions are strong and largely 
transparent with the opportunity for citizen enforcement, this 
approach relies heavily on states at a time when some state 
authorities actively oppose greenhouse gas controls, potentially 
setting up a significant battle between federal and state  
authorities and potentially undermining program effectiveness. 
 
Our review further suggests that there are some mitigation measures 
that could be taken to help ensure that a greenhouse gas control 
programs can be efficiently and successfully implemented to meet its  
environmental goals. Some of these measures include: 
• Congress should explicitly give EPA authority to create a robust 
greenhouse gas inventory with carefully prescribed CBI 
provisions that mirror EPA’s existing approach. 
• Offsets for forestry and agriculture should not be included in 
the program design if they are regulated by USDA alone.  At 
the same time, these offsets should not be laden with special 
provisions that obscure their transparency and the additionality 
of their emissions reductions and should not be exempt from 
citizen oversight. 
• All offset programs should be transparent to the public, with 
verification reports made readily available to the public. 
• Agency expertise should determine agency function in the 
greenhouse gas control program. Giving USDA or FERC 
oversight authority of certain program elements may undermine 
the programs. 
• The ability for citizens to participate in the oversight of the 
greenhouse gas control program should be carefully considered 
and facilitated in all programs. 
• Given the potentially conflicting roles of states, it is likely 
necessary for the greenhouse gas control program to limit 
state involvement and increase federal involvement, as compared 
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• All greenhouse gas control programs should be accompanied 
by robust compliance assurance programs to help regulators 
understand regulated sources and to help regulated sources 
understand regulatory requirements. 
Enforcement is usually considered the last element in environmental 
programs—it is what regulators turn to when regulated entities fail to 
abide by the rules. But as this review has shown, enforcement considerations 
are central in ensuring environmental effectiveness and, as such, should 
inform the design and policy choices made around federal greenhouse 
gas control options. 
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